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TOWARD ADDING FURTHER
COMPLEXITY TO THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE: A NEW PARADIGM
FOR THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF
CAPITAL LOSSES
Michelle Arnopol Cecil*
Professor Cecil, believing that the current tax treatment of capital losses is fundamentally unfair and economically inefficient, offers
a proposalto improve the capital loss limitation provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Three tax concepts provoke the proposal: the
progressivity of the current income tax structure, the notion that gains
and losses are taxed only after they are realized, and the preferential
treatment of capitalgains.
The present limitations on the deductibility of capital losses are
supported in theory by three justifications:parallelism,cherrypicking,
and bunching. The author argues, however, that the Code is illequipped to meet parallelism concerns and that cherrypicking is not a
problem that a capital loss limitation scheme should address.
Professor Cecil offers an alternative proposal for capital loss
treatment that provides for parallel treatment of capital gains and
losses by limiting the tax savings generated by capital losses to the tax
rate applicable to capital gains. Professor Cecil argues that her proposal is superior to the current treatment of capital losses in light of
fundamental fairness, economic efficiency, and political feasibility
concerns. Further, the proposal benefits all taxpayers, regardless of
income, and its added complexity results in fairnessfor all.
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INTRODUCTION

Nobody could possibly contend that the Internal Revenue Code
(the Code) 1 is a simple statute or one that is easy to comprehend. The
Code contains more than 5.5 million words2 spanning over eight thousand pages in the United States Code.' Moreover, the regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department to decipher the complex provisions
of the Code fill six thick volumes,' even though the print requires a magnifying glass to read. It has been estimated that taxpayers spend over five
billion hours 5 and two hundred billion dollars6 annually in their endless
efforts to comply with the Code. Those provisions in the Code pertaining
to capital gains and losses alone account for a significant amount of its
complexity.7
My tax professor in law school, Richard Kaplan,8 illustrated the
sheer magnitude of the capital gain and loss provisions in my most
memorable law school lecture. Prior to class, he had cut apart the Code,
stapled each provision separately, and replaced the provisions in their
binding so as to resemble the original volume. In class, Professor Kaplan
explained that capital gains added significant complexity to the Code.
"For example, without capital gains," he proclaimed, "we wouldn't need

1. Except as otherwise noted, references in this article to the Internal Revenue Code are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
2. See 144 CONG. REC. H4655 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bunning); 144
CONG. REC. H4663 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Chenoweth); 144 CONG. REC. H4669
(daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Paxon); 144 CONG. REC. H4664 (daily ed. June 17, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Riley). There are some who contend that the Internal Revenue Code contains as
many as seven million words. See 144 CONG. REC. H4656 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Dunn); 144 CONG. REC. H4675 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) ("[Olur tax
code is a seven million word monster."); 144 CONG. REC. H4674 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statenent
of Rep. Hastert); see also I.R.C. §§ 1-9833 (West 1988 & West Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998).
3. See 144 CONG. REC. H4659 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Schaefer) see also
144 CONG. REC. H4664 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Riley) (providing a more generous estimate of 17,000 pages). Moreover, politicians have proclaimed that the Internal Revenue Service has issued over 6200 pages of forms and instructions regarding how to file income tax returns. See
144 CONG. REC. H4656 (daily ed. June 17. 1998) (statement of Rep. Largent).
4. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.0-602.101 (CCH 1998).
5. See 144 CONG. REC. H4673 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Castle); 144 CONG.
REC. H4675 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
6. See 144 CONG. REC. H4655 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bunning); 144
CONG. REC. H4657 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Dunn); 144 CONG. REC. H4674 (daily
ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hastert); 144 CONG. REC. H4656 (daily ed. June 17, 1998)
(statement of Rep. Largent).
7. See, e.g., David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1116 (1986): see also Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 (1974) ("The fact that long-term capital gains are subject to a lower tax rate
than other types of income is perhaps the single most complicating aspect of existing law."): Bill
Bradley & Richard Gephardt, Fixing the Income Tax with the Fair Tax, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 41,
48 (1984) ("The capital gains exclusion enormously complicates tax law and administration, tax forms
and instructions, and business planning."); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains
Taxation: What's Law Got To Do With It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869, 870 (1985) ("[Clapital gains taxation creates problems for the tax system. It is the source of much of the complexity of the Code ....
").
8. Professor Richard L. Kaplan is a professor of law at the University of Illinois College of Law.
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section 1245, dealing with recapture."9 And with that, he removed section
1245 from the Code, threw it in the air, and it fluttered to the floor. After
repeating this exercise for the next twenty minutes with respect to the
other Code provisions dealing with capital gains and losses, Professor
Kaplan was standing knee-deep in the Code. The Code that remained at
the end of this demonstration was a mere shadow of its former self.
Yet although the Code's complexity is roundly criticized by politicians"° and the public alike, 1 it is only through complexity that the Code
can achieve fundamental fairness. For example, many would contend
that the provisions governing social security taxation t" are quite dense
and difficult to comprehend. The provisions could be simplified by
merely taxing all social security benefits in full. But Congress long ago
recognized that it would be fundamentally unfair if these benefits were
taxable for those at lower income levels. 3 As a result, Congress created
9. See I.R.C. § 1245 (1994).
10. A number of politicians have stated publicly that the Code is too complex and burdensome.
For example, during a recent floor debate in the House of Representatives, Representative Cannon
said that "[t]he current Tax Code puts an onerous burden on every American family. It is complex,
confusing, corrupt, costly, and coercive." 144 CONG. REC. H4668 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Cannon). Similarly, during the same debate, Representative Riley said that "our Tax Code is a
monstrosity.... It has become a Goliath that has to be slain.... Our Tax Code is too complicated and
it is far too complex." 144 CONG. REC. H4664 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Riley); see
also 144 CONG. REC. H4674 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hastert) ("The current tax
code is ... too complex, and too burdensome on America's families.").
In fact, many politicians have called for a repeal of the entire Code. "[O]nce and for all, let us eliminate 8000-plus pages in the Tax Code and replace it with a Tax Code that is going to say April 15 is
another bright, spring day." 144 CONG. REC. H4659 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Schaefer); see also 144 CONG. REC. H4658 (daily ed. June 17, 1998) (statement of Rep. Johnson)
("The current Tax Code is complex, confusing, corrupt, costly, coercive and a lot of other Cs that I
cannot think of.... We ought to also repeal the 16th Amendment of the Constitution [authorizing the
income tax] .... "). Both the House of Representatives and the Senate considered proposed legislation
during 1998 designed to terminate the tax code (except for Social Security) on December 31, 2002. See
The Tax Code Termination Act, H.R. 3097, 105th Cong. (1998); S. 1673, 105th Cong. (1998).
11. For example, a 1998 article in The Washington Post stated that "[t]he Internal Revenue
Code ... is clearly too complex. Built into it are dozens of preferences and traps, confusing both taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service." Albert B. Crenshaw, Tax Reformer: Beware of What You
Wish For,WASH. POST, June 21, 1998, at HI; see also Crack the Tax Code, DENV. POST, Mar. 17, 1998,
at B8 ("[Tihe IRS is saddled with a tax code so bloated it baffles even the agency's own accountants."): Daniel J. Mitchell, Get Rid of U.S. Tax Code and Start Over, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 15, 1998, at
1 ("Every year, without fail, more and more monkey wrenches are thrown [into the Code] until today
there isn't anyone who knows everything in the tax code or what it means.... [T]he tax code's 5.5 million words are a nightmare of complexity that defies the understanding of the most proficient tax experts."). See generally Jim Barlow, U.S. Tax System Is Made for Abuse, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 16, 1998,
at 1.
Even Shirley D. Peterson, former commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service during the Bush
administration, has publicly criticized the Code's complexity and called for its repeal. "The Internal
Revenue Code is inordinately complex, imposes an enormous burden on taxpayers and thus undermines compliance with the law.... It is time to repeal the Internal Revenue Code and start over."
Shirley D. Peterson, Patchwork Won't Help; It's Time to Start Over, HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1995, at
1.
12. See I.R.C. § 86 (1994).
13. In 1983, Congress enacted the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97
Stat. 65. In § 121 of the Act, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by adding a new
section that specifically included social security benefits in income. Due to fairness concerns, however,

HeinOnline -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1085 1999

1086

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1999

myriad exceptions to the rules governing social security taxation,14
thereby enhancing the complexity of the provisions. Complexity is inevitable because human circumstances and financial transactions take so
many forms.
This article seeks to improve the fairness of the capital loss limitation provisions of the Code in a manner possible only through greater
complexity. By way of background, capital gains 5 are generally taxed to
individuals at a maximum tax rate of 20%,16 even though under the progressive income tax system, individual taxpayers' other income, such as
wages and investment income, can be taxed up to a maximum rate of
nearly 40%. 17 Capital gains realized by corporations, on the other hand,
are taxed at the same rate as their other income; accordingly, there is
currently no capital gains preference applicable to corporations. 8
The capital gains preference has been the subject of a contentious
tax policy debate for several decades. 9 Although critics of the preference
have attacked it as antithetical to sound policy considerations, 20 the preference nevertheless remains a cornerstone of the income tax system

Congress excluded social security benefits from taxation at low income levels. See S. REP. No. 98-23, at
26 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 143, 167. The Senate Report states that
[b]y taxing only a portion of social security... the Committee's bill assures that lower-income individuals, many of whom rely upon their benefits to afford basic necessities, will not be taxed on
their benefits.... The bill's method for taxing benefits assures that only those taxpayers who have
substantial taxable income from other sources will be taxed on a portion of the benefits they receive.
Id.
14. See I.R.C. § 86(a)(1) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998) (providing that if a taxpayer's modified
adjusted gross income plus one-half of the social security benefits received during the year exceeds
$25,000 ($32,000 in the case of married taxpayers filing a joint return and $0 for married taxpayers filing separate returns), the taxpayer must include in gross income the lesser of one-half of the social
security benefits received during the year or one-half of such excess); § 86(a)(2) (West 1988 & West
Supp. 1998) (providing that if a taxpayer's modified adjusted gross income plus one-half of the social
security benefits received during the year exceeds $34,000 ($44,000 in the case of married taxpayers
filing a joint return and $0 for married taxpayers filing separate returns), the taxpayer must include in
gross income the lesser of (i) the sum of 85% of such excess plus the lesser of the amount determined
under § 86(a)(1) or $4,500 ($6,000 in the case of married taxpayers filing a joint return and $0 for married taxpayers filing separate returns); or (ii) 85% of the social security benefits received during the
year).
15. For a definition of what constitutes a capital gain, see infra note 98.
16. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 1988 & West Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998). For taxpayers in the 15% tax
bracket, however, their capital gains will be taxed at a maximum rate of only 10%. See id. Moreover,
certain types of capital gains, such as those arising out of the sale of collectibles, are taxed at a maximum rate of 28% (15% for taxpayers in the 15% tax bracket). See I.R.C. § 1(h)(5) (West Supp. Oct.
1998). For a complete discussion of the taxability of capital gains, see infra notes 98-123 and accompanying text.
17. See I.R.C. § l(a) (1994) (providing that ordinary income of individuals is taxed at a maximum
rate of 39.6%). The concept of progressivity is explained and defended infra Part I.A.
18. The taxable income of corporations is generally taxed at a maximum rate of 35%. See I.R.C.
§ 11 (1994). The Code provides, however, that if the maximum tax rate applicable to corporations
generally should ever exceed 35%, corporations' long-term capital gains will remain subject to a
maximum tax rate of 35%. See I.R.C. § 1201 (1994).
19. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
20. For a more complete discussion of these concerns, see infra notes 104-23 and accompanying
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based on two strong policy justifications. First, the capital gains preference provides some relief to the problem of "bunching," caused when a
capital asset that has appreciated over a number of years is sold in a single taxable year, and the corresponding gain is bunched into the year of
sale.2 Moreover, because capital gains are taxed only when taxpayers sell
assets and "realize" those gains,22 taxpayers, in the absence of preferential tax rates, might be unwilling to sell assets and reinvest the proceeds
in more economically productive ventures. 2' This phenomenon, often referred to as the "lock-in effect, 24 is based on the concept of economic efficiency and is perhaps the most compelling policy justification for the
capital gains preference.
Congress long ago recognized that if it wanted to induce taxpayers
to invest in risky undertakings, it would have to permit the deductibility
of capital losses' resulting from those investments.26 Because capital
gains were taxed at preferential rates, however, Congress felt it unfair to
allow capital losses to be deducted against ordinary income without limitation. Accordingly, with only one short-lived exception, there have
always been limitations imposed on the deductibility of capital losses.
Currently, individuals can offset their capital losses against their capital
gains, plus up to $3,000 of ordinary income.29 Corporations can offset
their capital losses only against their capital gains.3" These loss limitations
have traditionally been justified on three policy grounds. First, they provide for parallel treatment of capital gains and losses.31 Second, loss limitations prevent a tax avoidance scheme known as "cherrypicking, '' 32 in
which taxpayers sell their capital loss assets and offset those losses
against ordinary income while retaining their capital gain assets and
21. For a more complete discussion of the concept of bunching, see infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
22. The realization concept, also an important underpinning of the current income tax system, is
discussed and defended infra Part II.B.
23. See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932); see also H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 10-11
(1921), reprinted in 95 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS 10-11 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979)
[hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950].
24. A more complete discussion of the lock-in effect as a policy justification for the capital gains
preference is outlined infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.

25. For a complete definition of a capital loss, see infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
26. See, for example, infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of allowing the
deductibility of capital losses as an economic incentive to engage in risky investments. In addition, the
history of the deductibility of capital losses is outlined infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 30 (1942), reprintedin 108 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 29.
28. From 1918 until 1924, capital losses could be deducted against a taxpayer's income without
limitation. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(5), 40 Stat. 1057, 1067 (1919); see also infra notes
131-32 and accompanying text.
29. See I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1994).
30. See id. § 1211(a).

31. The concept of parallelism is outlined infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
32. For a more complete discussion of the concept of cherrypicking, see infra notes 151-57 and
accompanying text.
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avoiding the imposition of tax on that gain. The third traditional policy
justification for limitations on the deductibility of capital losses is
"bunching," 33 where taxpayers' capital losses have accrued over a number of years but are all realized in the year of sale.
I believe that the current loss limitation system is both fundamentally unfair to taxpayers and promotes economic inefficiency in the marketplace. The system is unfair because it is premised on the faulty assumption that all taxpayers with capital losses also have corresponding
capital gains in their investment portfolios. Although this assumption
might be true in the case of the wealthiest investors, a brief survey of my
meager investment portfolio would suggest that the assumption is untrue
in the case of a large number of middle-income investors.34 Accordingly,
a loss limitation system that is designed in large part to resolve the problem of cherrypicking will be fundamentally unfair when applied to average taxpayers. Similarly, the loss limitation system often results in economic inefficiency because taxpayers have no incentive to sell their loss
assets and reinvest the proceeds in more economically productive ventures unless they have assets with corresponding capital gains against
which to offset those losses.35
Because the current limitations on the deductibility of capital losses
are inherently flawed in these ways, this article creates a new paradigm
for the deductibility of capital losses, one that is more fundamentally fair
to all taxpayers and results in more economically efficient investment decision-making. This new paradigm is premised on the rather radical notion (radical at least in the small circle of tax scholars) that, although
parallelism and bunching are sound policy justifications for a loss limitation system, cherrypicking is not a legitimate policy justification for limiting the deductibility of capital losses. Thus, this model would provide
that capital losses could be offset against taxpayers' other income; however, the tax savings generated by those losses would be limited to the
tax rate applicable had the capital loss instead been a capital gain. For
example, individuals in the 31% tax bracket with long-term capital losses
would be entitled to offset those losses against their ordinary income, but
the tax savings generated by those losses would be capped at the 20%
rate applicable had the losses instead been long-term capital gains. Accordingly, in its simplest form, this paradigm would result in taxpayers
paying an 11% tax on the ordinary income offset by those losses (the

33. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the bunching concept.
34. See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a CapitalGains Preference,48
TAX L. REV. 319,328 n.36 (1993).
35. In the absence of a current tax benefit from the sale of loss assets, a taxpayer is likely to retain the loss assets in the hope that they will increase in value. This principle is true unless the taxpayer
can reinvest the proceeds from the sale of the loss assets in a venture that is certain to be profitable
enough to offset the taxpayer's economic loss. The concept of economic efficiency is discussed in
greater detail infra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
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31% rate otherwise applicable to the income less the 20% rate applicable
to long-term capital gains). This proposal not only creates a system that
is more fundamentally fair and economically efficient for all taxpayers
but also alleviates the problems associated with bunching of capital losses
and creates true parallelism between capital gains and losses.
Part II of this article seeks to justify, from a policy perspective, three
attributes of the current income tax system 36 that underlie my capital loss
proposal: progressivity, realization, and the capital gains preference. Part
III then explores the current limitations on the deductibility of capital
losses, with particular emphasis on the policies underlying these limitations. Finally, part IV proposes a new paradigm for the deductibility of
capital losses. It begins by identifying problems inherent in the current
deductibility scheme. It then proposes that capital losses be allowed to
offset all types of income but only up to the tax rate that would have
been imposed had the loss instead been a capital gain. The article attempts to justify the proposal on the grounds of fundamental fairness and
economic efficiency. It also demonstrates the proposal's political feasibility, relying in part on a public choice theory model. The article further
responds to the potential criticisms that the proposal benefits only
wealthy taxpayers and adds further complexity to the Internal Revenue
Code. It concludes that adopting a new paradigm for the deductibility of
capital losses would provide a fairer and more economically efficient solution to the problems giving rise to the need for loss limitations that

36. There is, of course, a raging debate over whether the income tax should be replaced by a
consumption tax. There are a number of different types of consumption-based taxes. Direct consumption taxes, such as the cash flow tax, impose a direct tax on individuals, based roughly on their consumption. On the other hand, indirect consumption taxes, including value-added taxes and retail sales
taxes, are borne indirectly by individuals because the taxes are paid by businesses, which presumably
pass the cost on to consumers. See Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Sim-

plicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 181 (1997). The general feature
common to all consumption taxes is that they do not impose any tax burden on savings or investments.
See MICHAEL J. GRAETz, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 198 (1997).
A national sales tax has been defined as "a tax on final sales by retail businesses to consumers."
THE AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS & MARTIN A. SULLIVAN, CHANGING AMERICA'S
TAX SYSTEM: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 4 (1996) (hereinafter CHANGING AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM].

In 1997 alone, three separate proposals calling for a national sales tax were introduced in Congress.
See S. 163, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1439, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1541, 105th Cong. (1997).
The person most frequently credited with beginning the consumption tax debate is Professor Bill
Andrews of Harvard. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow PersonalIncome
Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1148-65 (1974). See generally, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S.
TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (Rev. 2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
BRADFORD] (discussing proposed modifications of and possible alternatives to the current tax system); Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, The Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption
Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539 (1998) (evaluating the impact of a consumption tax); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979) (arguing that implementing a
consumption tax is feasible but difficult and politically unworkable); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much
Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1
(1996) (evaluating the effects of taxing cash flows and comparing that alternative to the current system). For an exhaustive list of articles weighing in on the policy debate over a consumption-based tax,
see Paul, supra, at 155 n.7. This article is premised on the continued viability of the income tax.
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have plagued legislators since the inception of the income tax at the beginning of this century.
II. DEFENDING PROGRESSIVITY, REALIZATION, AND THE CAPITAL
GAINS PREFERENCE: A BRIEF POLICY PERSPECTIVE

The proposal for the deductibility of capital losses contained in part
IV of this article is premised on three attributes of the present tax system: a progressive tax rate structure, the concept that gains and losses are
not taxed until they are "realized," and the preferential tax treatment of
capital gains. Each of these topics has generated volumes of tax literature
over the years, and I will not rehash the debates in each of these areas.
Nevertheless, I feel compelled to justify these three tax concepts, if only
briefly, inasmuch as my proposal is premised on their continued viability.
A.

Progressivity

Under a progressive income tax structure, tax rates increase as taxable income increases.37 Accordingly, wealthy taxpayers will not only pay
more taxes on an absolute dollar basis but also pay a higher percentage
of income into the tax coffers."a Recently, several legal scholars have
called for a flat tax, which would rid the tax system of its progressive
characteristics.39 Although political campaign rhetoric may foster public
support for a flat tax,' its adoption is unlikely at best for the reasons
outlined below.

37. The definition of progressivity is more complex than is alluded to here. For an in-depth discussion of the meaning of progressivity, see Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 739, 742-47 (1995). Most commentators ultimately agree, however, that when we speak of
progressivity, we generally mean that tax rates increase as we move up the income scale. See id. at 742.
38. For example, when I was earning big bucks as an associate in a large law firm, much of my
income was taxed at a rate as high as 36%. Now, as a law professor earning a paltry salary, I pay no
more than 28% of my income to Uncle Sam.
39. See generally, e.g., ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995);
Steven A. Bank, Originsof a Flat Tax, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 329 (1996); Michael Calegari, Flat Taxes
and Effective Tax Planning,51 NAT'L TAX J. 689 (1998); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Simplicity of the
Flat Tax: Is It Unique?, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 283 (1997); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Tax Policy for PostLiberal Society: A Flat-Tax-Inspired Redefinition of the Purpose and Ideal Structure of a Progressive
Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 727 (1985). For a complete guide to the flat tax proposals as of January 1996, see RESEARCH INST. OF AM., TAX PLANNING & PRACTICE GUIDE: FLAT TAX PROPOSALS
(1996) [hereinafter FLAT TAX PROPOSALS].
40. Milton Friedman first proposed the flat tax in 1962, but it received little attention at that
time. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 161-89 (1962). In 1995, House
Majority Leader Dick Armey captured the attention of the American public by introducing a flat tax
proposal in Congress entitled "The Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act." See H.R. 2060, 104th
Cong. (1995). Under Representative Armey's flat tax proposal, "individuals pay a wage tax at a flat
Every
rate .... All capital income-interest, dividends, capital gains, and so on- [is] untaxed ....
itemized deduction and every tax credit allowed under current law would be repealed under the Flat
Tax." CHANGING AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 88.
In his September 22, 1995, presidential announcement speech entitled "A New Conservative Vision," Steve Forbes introduced his flat tax proposal as follows:
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The American income tax rate structure has been progressive since
the inception of the income tax in 1913. 4' The two historic policy justifications favoring progressivity have been based on "ability to pay" and "redistribution of wealth" principles.42 Each of these concepts will be examined in turn.
1.

Ability to Pay

Early case law upheld the constitutionality of progressivity 43 and justified it as the natural extension of the fundamental principle that taxpayers are to be taxed according to their "ability to pay." 44 Thus, in
Commissioner v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 4 5 the Seventh Circuit stated
that "[t]he great argument which resulted in this country's adoption of an
income tax, and the fundamental principle upon which that tax is still
based, is that individuals will be taxed according to their ability to pay."'
Start by scrapping the tax code. Don't fiddle with it. Junk it. Throw it out. Bury it. Replace it with
a pro-growth, pro-family tax cut that lowers tax rates to 17% across the board and expands exemptions for individuals and children so that a family of four would pay no taxes on the first
$36,000 of income.... The flat tax would be simple. You could fill it out on a postcard. It would
be honest. It would eliminate the principal source of political corruption in Washington. It would
be fair. Millions of people would be off the federal income tax rolls.
FLAT TAX PROPOSALS, supra note 39, at 56; see also Christopher Farrell, A Flat Tax Is Flat-out Risky,
Bus. WK., Feb. 19, 1996, at 80; Good, Better, Best in Tax Reform, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1996, at 18; Allan
Sloan, Forbes Speaks from a Flat Tax Bible, With a Little PoliticalNumber-Fudging,WASH. POST, Jan.
23, 1996, at C3.
41. See Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166-67 (1913).
42. This is not to suggest that there are only two justifications that have been proffered in favor
of progressivity. For example, it has long been suggested that one way to justify progressivity philosophically is through a "benefit theory," whereby those who earn more money should pay a higher
percentage of it to the government because they receive a greater percentage of the benefits provided
by the government to society. Commentators have noted, however, that no empirical proof exists to
support such a theory; instead they posit that the opposite appears to be true. See, e.g., Jeffrey A.
Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Considerationof the PhilosophicalBases for Unequal
Taxation of Individuals,12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 221, 225-33 (1995). "[Tjhere is considerable opinion that
much in the way of government benefit flows to the poor and the lower middle classes, who have the
overwhelming number of votes.... [M]any government programs are means-tested, thus limiting
benefits that flow to the higher income earners." Id. at 225-26. Because there is no empirical evidence
supporting a benefit theory, and it seems normatively inaccurate, I have chosen to focus the remainder
of this section on the two theories that have garnered greater support among tax scholars.
43. See Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 26 (1916) ("[Wle cannot escape the
conclusion that [all of the contentions relied upon in attacking progressivity] rest upon the mistaken
theory that although there be [sic] differences between the subjects taxed, to differently tax them transcends the limit of taxation and amounts to a want of due process .... ").
44. See, e.g., Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1935) ("One of the fundamental
principles of taxation is that the incidence of a tax should be in accordance with the ability to pay.").
For an article discussing the constitutionality of progressivity, see Erin A. O'Hara & William R. Dougan, Redistribution Through Discriminatory Taxes: A Contractarian Explanation of the Role of the
Courts, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 869 (1998).
45. 217 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1954).
46. Id. at 61. Similarly, the Treasury Department has recognized that "capacity to pay.., is the
foundation of an income tax levied at progressive rates." SUBCOMM. OF THE COMM. ON WAYS &
MEANS,

73D

CONG.,

PRELIMINARY

REPORT

RELATIVE

TO

METHODS

OF

PREVENTING

THE

AVOIDANCE AND EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR
THE SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF 4 (Comm. Print 1933) [hereinafter SUBCOMM.
PRELIMINARY REPORT] (statement of the Acting Secretary of the Treasury), reprinted in 100
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Following these early cases, both subsequent case law and the legal literature remained relatively silent on the merits of progressivity.
In 1952, Professors Blum and Kalven, then mere neophytes at the
University of Chicago Law School, published what was to become the
seminal piece in the progressivity debate. In their article, The Uneasy
Case for Progressive Taxation,47 the authors relied, at least in part, on notions such as ability to pay, benefit, and sacrifice to conclude that "[t]he
case for progression, after a long critical look, thus turns out to be stubborn but uneasy."48
The argument most commonly posited against using ability to pay as
a policy justification for progressivity is that progressivity creates a disincentive to be productive, thereby decreasing work effort.49 Accordingly,
when tax rates are progressive, this disincentive to work decreases ability
to pay, thereby creating a vicious circle. I believe, however, that this argument does injustice to the intelligence of most taxpayers. We understand that, as our income rises, possibly through increased work effort,
the percentage of tax that we will pay on that income will also rise; nevertheless, our efforts are still rewarded because we retain the bulk of those
earnings even after taxation. Moreover, we understand that it is not so
much the increasing tax rates caused by progressivity that might create a
disincentive to work; rather, high tax rates generally could create the
same disincentive. Thus, even under a flat tax system, if all income is
taxed at a high rate, say 70%, this would create a far greater disincentive
to work than the progressive structure that is in place now, where the
highest tax rate can reach 40%." 0 Therefore, it is not progressivity that
creates a disincentive to work; instead, it is high marginal tax rates generally."
Others have criticized the use of ability to pay as a philosophical
justification of progressivity under more fundamental notions of individual autonomy and equality. For example, Professor Schoenblum of Vanderbilt recently suggested that ability to pay has become so widely accepted by tax scholars that "[t]hey tend to assume uncritically that there
is a direct relation between ability to pay and fairness."52 He suggests that
"[sluch a view is obviously in conflict with basic liberal concepts of individual autonomy, private property, and the equal treatment of all persons by the state."53 Professor Schoenblum concludes that ability to pay

INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 4.
47. Walter S. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI.

L. REV. 417 (1952).
48. Id. at 519.
49. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1944 (1987).

50.
51.
52.
53.

See I.R.C. § 1 (1994) (providing that the highest individual income tax rate is 39.6%).
See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 37, at 755.
Schoenblum, supra note 42, at 235.
Id.
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can be justified, if at all, under the broader
4 concept of utilitarianism, or
the impact of progressivity across society.
Accepting, as I do, Professor Schoenblum's criticism that ability to
pay cannot, in a vacuum, justify progressivity, I am then forced to ask
whether it is fair to ask individuals who earn more to pay a higher percentage of their earnings to the government for the greater social good.
This question leads to the second, and more persuasive, argument in favor of progressivity: redistribution of wealth.
2.

Redistributionof Wealth

Perhaps because of the comprehensiveness of the progressivity article written by Professors Blum and Kalven, few academics devoted much
time or energy to the discussion of progressivity until the mid-1980s,
when the debate was rejuvenated by the "anti-progressive, or 'flat tax'
movement."55 This recent tax scholarship, however, has focused far less
on ability to pay as a policy justification for progressivity and, instead,
has reinvigorated the notion of distributive justice, first raised in the
Blum and Kalven article," as the leading policy justification underlying
progressivity 7 Under notions of distributive justice, progressivity can be
viewed as a means of reducing economic inequalities by redistributing
wealth from the rich to the poor:
[I]n the end it is the implications about economic inequality which
impart significance and permanence to the issue and institution of
progression. Ultimately a serious interest in progression stems from
the fact that a progressive tax is perhaps the cardinal instance of the
democratic community struggling with its hardest problem.58
Although the current genre of tax scholars employs a wide variety
of policy perspectives, each scholar ultimately concludes that the case for
progressivity can best be justified under redistribution of wealth principles. For example, Professors Bankman and Griffith combine an optimal
tax structure theory with a welfarist theory of distributive justice to con-

54. See id. at 236. Professor Schoenblum in fact concludes that utilitarianism cannot, in the end,
justify progressive taxation. See id. at 236-42.
55. Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of
the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 416 (1998).
56. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 47, at 518-20.
57. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 49, at 1966; see also Marjorie E.Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465,
490-97 (1987) [hereinafter Kornhauser, A Typical Male Reaction]. It is interesting to note that when
Professor Kornhauser wrote her article in 1987, she observed that advocates of progressivity that had
come before her had defended the concept far less on its redistributive powers than on the equitable
notion of ability to pay. See id. at 465 n.3. Thus, it has been a relatively recent phenomenon that tax
scholars have begun to explore redistribution of wealth principles as the primary policy justification of
progressivity. For a discussion of the popularity of the progressivity of the income tax based on its potential for redistribution of wealth, see Charlotte Crane, Shifting from an Income Tax to a Consumption Tax, in TAXING AMERICA 146, 147-48 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
58. Blum & Kalven, supra note 47, at 520.
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clude that, because progressivity redistributes income from the rich to
the poor, "the case for progressive taxation appears to be far less uneasy
than has been claimed."' 9
Similarly, Professor Kornhauser has written a series of articles justifying progressivity using traditional notions of feminist jurisprudence.'
In these articles, Professor Kornhauser suggests that progressivity can be
supported under a feminist "ethos of care," which she defines as "a per61
ception of one's interconnectedness with, and responsibility to, others.
Thus, under Professor Kornhauser's view, progressivity is valuable because it offers society a relatively painless way to take care of those who
are less fortunate. More specifically:
The progressive income tax is a good way to reaffirm our nation's
sense of community against the pulls of individuality. It acknowledges a commitment and sense of responsibility to the other members of our society. Without this sense of connectedness and obligation we lose our sense of identity as a nation.62
Finally, Professor Byrne examines whether progressivity can be justified, at least in part, under traditional philosophical notions of equalitarianism set forth by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.63 She suggests
that "[i]f the theoretical structure supporting progressivity is made of
pillars such as equal distribution [Rawls] and distinctions between wealth
arising from luck and ambition [Dworkin], perhaps the case for progressivity is not so uneasy."' Professor Byrne concludes that the progressivity debate should focus not only on traditional economic arguments for
and against progressivity but should be expanded to also include a disfaircussion of legal philosophers' arguments for distributive justice and
65
ness "that seem to give progressive taxation its instinctive appeal.,
These brief synopses provide but a glimpse of the myriad arguments
being made in favor of progressivity under notions of redistribution of
wealth and distributive justice. Yet whether one accepts progressivity
under a feminist ethos of care, Rawlsian equalitarianism, a welfarist theory of distributive justice, or simply because it feels right intuitively,'M it is
clear that distributive justice principles best illustrate the case for pro59.

Bankman & Griffith, supra note 49, at 1967.

60.

See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, What Do Women Want: Feminism and the ProgressiveIn-

come Tax, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 105 (1997) [hereinafter Kornhauser, What Do Women Want]; Komhauser, A Typical Male Reaction, supra note 57. But see William J. Turnier et al., Redistributive Justice and
Cultural Feminism, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1275 (1996) (using an empirical analysis to challenge Professor

Kornhauser's claim that under the feminist ethos of care, women would support progressivity far more
than men).
61.

Kornhauser, What Do Women Want, supra note 60, at 153 n.9.

62.

Kornhauser, A Typical Male Reaction, supra note 57, at 522.

63.

See Byrne, supra note 37, at 774-82; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971);

Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality?Part2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHtL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981).
64. Byrne, supra note 37, at 789.
65. Id. at 742.
66. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 47, at 418 (stating that, like most, they find the notion of progressivity congenial).
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gressivity. And although progressive taxation will continue to have its
strong critics, 67 it nonetheless appears that progressivity will remain a
touchstone of the income tax system.
B.

The Realization Concept

One of the first and most fundamental concepts that law students in
a basic income tax course learn is that gains and losses are taxed only
when they are "realized." ' Realization typically occurs when an asset is
sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of by taxpayers.69 Because taxpayers can carefully time when they will be taxed on their gains and
losses, if at all,7" tax scholars have for years attacked the realization concept as antithetical to an ideal income base.71
Over half a century ago, two noted economists attempted independently to define what would constitute an ideal and comprehensive
income tax base. These economists, Robert Haig and Henry Simons,
concluded that income should be defined as the sum of a taxpayer's consumption plus any changes in his net worth over the relevant accounting
period. Under the Haig-Simons definition of income, tax deferral would
be impermissible; therefore, any appreciation in the fair market value of
an asset would be taxed each year as it accrues, rather than waiting until
the asset is sold, and the gain is realized.73

67. Proponents of the flat tax, for example, are the most outspoken critics of progressivity. See
supranotes 39-40 and accompanying text.
68. As one noted tax scholar stated, "[tihe principle of realization has historically been central to
the jurisprudence of the federal income tax." Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation,
SectorialAccretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 861 (1997).
69. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1994) (providing rules for determining calculation of gain or loss on sale of
property). Even the definition of realization, however, is less than clear. Although a discussion of how
the realization concept has evolved over time is beyond the scope of this article, it is discussed in some
detail in Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the
FederalIncome Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 10-14 (1992).
70. When property is acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, the basis of the property in the
hands of the recipient will generally be its fair market value at the date of decedent's death (unless a
statutorily provided alternative valuation date is chosen), rather than the decedent's original basis in
the property. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998). Thus, this basis (as adjusted) will
be used to determine the recipient's gain or loss when the property is later sold or exchanged. See
I.R.C. §§ 1001, 1011 (1994); see also Hess v. United States, 537 F.2d 457, 462 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Accordingly, any unrealized gain attributable to the period during which the decedent held the property escapes tax permanently. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 69, at 16.
71. See, e.g., Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposalfor Retrospective Taxation, 52
TAX L. REV. 45, 48 (1996); see also BRADFORD, supra note 36, at 5; Shakow, supra note 7, at 1114-18.
72. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938); Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economicsand Legal
Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921), reprinted in IX READINGS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959). More specifically, Simons defines income as "the algebraic sum of [1] the market value of rights exercised in consumption and [2] the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end
of the period in question." SIMONS, supra, at 50.
73. See Land, supra note 71, at 48.

HeinOnline -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1095 1999

1096

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1999

Nevertheless, the realization requirement, like progressivity, has
been a mainstay of the Code almost since the Code's inception in 1913."4
Although the realization concept can be justified on several policy
grounds, each centers around the fundamental concept of administrative
feasibility." It is simply impracticable to tax gains annually as they accrue
because of the valuation and liquidity problems associated with such a
tax.7 6 Moreover, such an accrual system would require that the government compensate a taxpayer for losses as they accrue as well, an approach that would not only be impossible to administer but would lead to
ridiculous results. These three primary policy justifications for realization- liquidity, valuation, and loss refunds- will be explored briefly.
1.

The Problem of Liquidity

If taxpayers are required to pay income tax on unrealized gains as
they accrue (a system often called an accretion-type tax),77 they will be
faced with the dilemma of being required either to sell the asset that has
produced the gain to pay the tax or to find an outside income source with
which to pay the tax.78 This problem of liquidity has long been one of the
primary justifications of the realization concept." The Code, whenever
74. The realization requirement first became a part of the Code in 1924 and was codified as §
202(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1924. Although the requirement has been relocated to numerous other Code sections throughout the years, it consistently has remained a part of the Code's
structure. Today, the realization requirement is contained in I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(b). See I.R.C. § 1001(a)(b) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998). For a more complete discussion of the history of the realization
concept and arguments marshaled against it, see Zelinsky, supra note 68, at 866-79.
75. It is important to understand that not all tax scholars accept administrative feasibility as
enough of a justification to abandon Haig-Simons in favor of realization. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral,88 MICH. L. REv. 722, 724-28 (1990); see also Land,
supra note 71, at 59-73.
76. See Shakow, supra note 7, at 1113-14.
77. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 36, at 1113.
78. As Professor Andrews, who favors a consumption-based personal income tax, admitted, in
cases such as
small farm owners, other owners of family businesses, elderly homeowners with small fixed incomes, and speculative investors heavily committed to a single project -the necessity of paying
tax on unrealized appreciation might work a substantial hardship. It might compel the liquidation
of part or all of an investment at a price below what it would otherwise be worth, because the sale
is forced ....
Moreover, a taxpayer may be discouraged from making vigorous selling efforts with
respect to a small part of his investment, because of the adverse tax effect on the valuation of his
remaining holdings if he secures a favorable price ....A tax on unrealized appreciation might
therefore tend to discourage investment in illiquid and risky ventures.
Andrews, supranote 36, at 1143; see also Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXEs 247, 254-55 (1957).
Conversely, other commentators are less sympathetic to the liquidity argument. For example, one
author, who has proposed taxing gains inherent in publicly traded stock annually as they accrue, recognizes that his proposal would force some shareholders to liquidate portions of their investments to
pay the resulting taxes. See David Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the Appreciation of Publicly
Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623, 646 (1967). The author, however, dismisses this liquidity problem as a
cost of investment: "It is immaterial that [the investor] might have preferred not to sell, even at an appreciated price. Tax assessments limit everyone's ability to invest, and there is nothing in the situation
of the public shareholder to justify giving him any special considerations." Id. at 646-47.
79. See BRADFORD, supranote 36, at 73-74; see also Zelinsky, supra note 68, at 889 ("Along with
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possible, attempts to match the imposition of a tax with the receipt of income with which to pay that tax.' As one scholar aptly stated:
The income tax appears to be politically acceptable largely because
it is based on ability to pay. This ability to pay depends on liquidity
as well as net worth. A system that taxes increases in net worth
without regard to liquidity will disrupt the affairs of taxpayers far
more than a system that simply scoops up some of the cash when it
appears at the time of sale.8'
Moreover, it is widely accepted that mere appreciation in the value
of an asset is a "paper profit" that-can easily be wiped out in subsequent
years. 82 In fact, Henry Simons, a principal architect of the Haig-Simons
definition of an ideal income tax base,83 noted that "[t]he realization criterion is not only indispensable to a feasible income-tax system but relatively unobjectionable in principle where it results only in postponement
of assessment, or in cancellation of earlier 'paper profits' against subsequent paper losses."' Thus, from the standpoint of administrative feasibility, the realization concept can be justified on the need for liquidity.
2.

The Valuation Issue

A second practical problem arising from an accretion-type tax is
that such a system would require that assets be valued annually to determine the amount to be included in, or deducted from, gross income.85
valuation, liquidity considerations have traditionally been viewed as underpinning the doctrine of realization.").
80. For example, the installment sale rules, found in I.R.C. § 453, are designed to prevent sellers
from incurring tax liabilities before they have received sufficient income to cover the tax payments.
See Entire Basis Recoverable with FirstInstallment, 34 TAx'N FOR ACcT. 296 (1985). Similarly, I.R.C. §
351, which allows taxpayers to incorporate their business on a tax-free basis if certain requirements are
met, is designed in large part to eliminate the liquidity problems that taxpayers would face if required
to incur a tax liability on the gain inherent in their assets upon incorporation. See, e.g., Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporationsand Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11
VA. TAX REV. 349,392 (1991).
81. Land, supra note 71, at 55. Professor Land, however, stresses that if we were to move to an
accretion-type tax, in which appreciation is taxed annually, taxpayers would simply plan their affairs so
as to have enough cash on hand to pay the taxes that are due. See id. He points to a number of situations in which taxpayers are required under the current system to pay taxes without corresponding
cash flow, and they plan their financial affairs accordingly. See id. For example, investors in a passthrough entity, such as a partnership or an S corporation, are taxed on their share of the entity's income, even if that income is not distributed to them. See id. Similarly, some financial instruments are
marked to market, meaning that the gain inherent in those instruments is taxed to the investors before
any corresponding cash is received by them. See id. Thus, Professor Land argues that taxpayers could
adapt to an accretion-type tax system if necessary. See id. Professor Shakow agrees, citing to empirical
studies that indicate that taxpayers can and do respond to an accretion-type tax. See Shakow, supra
note 7, at 1174-76. Others, however, disagree. For example, one tax scholar stated that even if a true
accretion-based tax system might be attractive, it does not necessarily follow that the partial accretionism that these authors propose is good. See Zelinsky, supra note 68, at 863.
82. See Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REV. 925, 969 (1967); see also Zelinsky, supra note 68, at 893-900.
83. See SIMONS,supra note 72.
84. Id. at 162.
85. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 82, at 968; see also Land, supra note 71, at 55-56. Professor Land
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Although valuation might be easily accomplished with respect to certain
types of assets, such as publicly traded stock,' annually valuing assets
such as farms or equipment would be not only prohibitively expensive
but also inaccurate.87 Valuation is not an exact science;' therefore, it
seems unfair to require taxpayers to calculate their income taxes on the
basis of such annual valuations.8 9 Again, Professor Simons himself recognized the administrative nightmare that would result from such annual
valuations. "Outright abandonment of the realization criterion would be
utter folly; no workable scheme can require that taxpayers reappraise
and report all their assets annually; and, while this procedure is implied
by the underlying definition of income, it is quite unnecessary to effective
application of that definition.'
Other highly regarded tax scholars have similarly conceded that
valuation difficulties present an insurmountable obstacle to complete adherence to the Haig-Simons definition of an ideal income tax base. For
example, admitting that taxing unrealized appreciation would create unacceptable valuation and administrative problems, Professor Bittker has
concluded that "[sluch concessions.., are adjustments to practicality,
rather than an integral part of the [Haig-Simons] definition."'"
3.

Loss Refunds

A third justification for a realization-based income tax system is the
concept of loss refunds. Recall that under the Haig-Simons model of an

recognizes that the administrative burden resulting from annual valuation would be "prohibitive." See
id. at 55.
86. Indeed, some commentators have proposed that appreciation inherent in publicly traded
stock be taxed annually because valuation does not provide an obstacle to taxation. See, e.g., Daniel
Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for Research, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 493, 502 (1998);
Slawson, supra note 78, at 626, 644-47 (arguing that, by taxing appreciation inherent in stock annually
as it accrues, investors would have no tax disincentive to selling that stock and investing it in more
profitable ventures, thereby eliminating the so-called lock-in effect). Others would go even further,
requiring most, but not all, assets to be valued and taxed annually. See, e.g., Shakow, supra note 7, at
1118-67.
87. See Andrews, supra note 36, at 1141-42; Land, supra note 71, at 55-58.
88. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 36, at 1141-42 ("[V]aluation is a matter of reasonable ranges
rather than discrete figures."); Land, supra note 71, at 56-57 ("Except for assets that are publicly
traded or can be readily converted to cash ... valuation is an exercise in make believe.").
89. See BRADFORD, supra note 36, at 73 (stating that for assets other than publicly traded stocks
and securities, "the costs and problems of evaluation [sic] would be formidable, and the enforcement
problems would be substantial"); see also Deborah L. Paul, Another Uneasy Compromise: The Treatment of Hedging in a RealizationIncome Tax, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 6 (1996).
90. SIMONS, supra note 72, at 207-08. Similarly, Professor Andrews has conceded that "[any
change that would make computation of tax liabilities depend generally on the valuation of investment
assets would represent an enormous transformation in the tax from a practical operating viewpoint."
Andrews, supra note 35, at 1142; see also Land, supra note 71, at 57-58.
91. Bittker, supra note 82, at 932; see also Halperin, supra note 86, at 499 ("Most likely the retention of the realization requirement... is explained by a desire to minimize valuation and liquidity
problems...."); Zelinsky, supra note 68, at 879 ("Valuation concerns have traditionally been identified as underpinning the rule of realization .... ).
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ideal income tax base, tax deferral is impermissible. 92 Thus, under a true
accretion-type tax system, an increase in income, defined as the sum of
consumption plus changes in net worth, would be subject to tax at the
end of the taxpayer's annual accounting period. It follows, then, that a
decrease in income over the taxpayer's annual accounting period would
require the government to return the unfortunate taxpayer's losses in the
form of a tax refund.93 From a practical perspective, the concept seems
administratively infeasible at best;94 such a refund program would strain
government revenues, perhaps to the breaking point. 9
Most tax scholars simply assume that under an accretion-type tax,
losses would be nonrefundable; that is, taxpayers who have overall losses
for the year would not receive refunds from the government on account
of those losses.96 Accordingly, there is little by way of academic literature
or empirical studies addressing the concern over loss refunds as a policy
justification for retaining the Code's realization requirement. Yet the
practical concerns associated with requiring the government to reimburse
taxpayers for their losses under a true accretion-type tax scheme, coupled with the valuation and liquidity problems outlined above, justify the
need for a realization-based income tax.97
C.

The CapitalGains Preference

Under the Code, long-term capital gains for individuals are taxed at
preferential rates.98 Beginning on January 1, 1998, the retroactive effec92. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
93. See MARTIN DAVID, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 166
(1968); see also Fellows, supra note 75, at 803-04; Land, supra note 71, at 92. The time-adjustedrealization-event-tax (TARET) model proposes just such a loss refund system, based upon the HaigSimons model of an ideal income tax base. See Fellows, supra note 75, at 728, 741. "TARET's promise
of increased fairness and economic neutrality depends on its ability ... to identify the appropriate tax
rate and interest rate factors to determine the tax liability (or refund) due when a realization event
occurs." Id. at 741. For a comprehensive list of scholars discussing a TARET model of taxation, see
Fellows, supra note 75, at 728 n.16.
94. See Fellows, supra note 75, at 804 (suggesting that a refund rule would be "politically unacceptable").
95. See id. Professor Fellows argues, however, that the lost revenue occurring as a result of such
loss refunds might well be offset by increased revenues realized by the government on account of taxing unrealized gains. See id.
96. See, e.g., Robert H. Scarborough, Risk, Diversification and the Design of Loss Limitations
Under a Realization-BasedIncome Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 677, 692-93 (1993).
97. Scholars have posited a number of arguments against a realization-based income tax. The
first criticism, the so-called lock-in effect, is discussed infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text. Others include added complexity to the Code, as well as vertical and horizontal equity concerns. For a
comprehensive discussion of the arguments against realization, see Land, supra note 71, at 48-54.
98. A capital gain is defined as a gain resulting from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. See
I.R.C. § 1222(1)-(4) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998). A long-term capital gain results when the asset
being sold or exchanged has been held by the taxpayer for more than one year. See I.R.C. § 1222(3)
(West 1988 & West Supp. 1998). Although the holding period for long-term capital gains is currently
one year, Congress has tinkered with the holding period frequently and, as recently as 1997, the holding period was 18 months. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788. By contrast, short-term capital gains are taxed at ordinary income rates. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 1988 & West
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tive date of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 19989 with respect
to capital gains, the preferential tax rate for long-term capital gains for
most taxpayers is 20%. For individual taxpayers in the 15% tax bracket,
however, any long-term capital gains will generally be taxed at a 10%
rate."° The Code also provides that the 20% rate will be reduced to 18%
for assets acquired after December 31, 2000, and held for a period of
more than five years.0 " Similarly, the 10% capital gains rate will be reduced to 8% with respect to assets that have been held for more than five
years and are sold after December 31, 2000."°
Unlike individuals, corporations are not entitled to any preferential
tax treatment for their long-term capital gains. Thus, if corporations sell
capital assets held for more than one year, any gains resulting from those
sales will be taxed at the same rates as ordinary business income. 103
Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998). For a detailed history of the capital gains preference, see Kornhauser, supra
note 7; see also GREGG ESENWEIN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., 105TH CONG., REPORT ON

INDIVIDUAL CAPITAL GAINS INCOME: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 3-11 (Library of Congress 1998) [hereinafter CRS REPORT]; Anita Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Federal Income Tax, 1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12 (1949).
99. See IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 1001-9016, 112 Stat.
685.
100. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 1988 & West Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998). The preferential tax rates
accorded long-term capital gains were greatly complicated by the 1997 Act. For example, long-term
capital gains arising out of the sale of § 1250 property (generally depreciable real property) are taxed
at a 25% tax rate rather than the general 20% tax rate accorded long-term capital gains but only to the
extent that the depreciation that is claimed with respect to the property is not recaptured as ordinary
income (referred to as "unrecaptured § 1250 gain"). See I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 1988 & West Supps. 1998
& Oct. 1998); I.R.C. § 1250 (1994). Similarly, long-term capital gains arising from the sale of collectibles that have been held for more than one year are taxed at a 28% tax rate instead of the normal 20%
long-term capital gains rate. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(5) (West 1988 & West Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998). The
definition of collectibles for purposes of this provision is found in I.R.C. § 1(h)(6) (West 1988 & West
Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998). With respect to taxpayers in the 15% tax bracket, however, both the 25%
rate applicable to the sale of § 1250 property and the 28% rate applicable to the sale of collectibles are
reduced to 15% to ensure that taxpayers are not required to pay tax at a higher rate on the sale of
capital gain property than on their ordinary income. See id. § 1(h).
The 1997 Act had also provided that long-term capital gains resulting from the sale or exchange of
capital assets held for more than one year but not more than 18 months would be taxed at a 28% rate
rather than a 20% rate. This portion of the 1997 Act was repealed by the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 5001(a)-(b), 112 Stat. 685. Accordingly, as of January 1, 1998,
all gains resulting from the sale or exchange of capital assets held for more than one year, other than
those arising from the sale of collectibles or § 1250 property, are taxed at the 20% (or 10%) tax rate
outlined in the text. See IRS Restructuring and Reform Act § 5001(a)-(b). The reason for the 1998
amendments, which took effect less than one year after the passage of the 1997 Act, was to reduce the
complexities created by the 1997 Act. See 144 CONG. REC. H5353 (daily ed. June 25, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Archer) ("[Wle reduce the complexity that 16 million Americans endured when they filled out
their.., capital gains forms. By changing the holding period from 18 months to 12 months, we bring
greater simplicity to the lives of taxpayers."); see also 144 CONG. REC. S7658 (daily ed. July 8, 1998)
(statement of Sen. McCain).
101. See I.R.C. § l(h)(2)(B) (West Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998).
102. See id. § 1(h)(2)(A). It is interesting to note the disparity between the tax reduction applicable to long-term capital gains taxed at the 20% rate versus the 10% rate. With respect to the former,
the capital assets must have been acquired after December 31, 2000, and for the latter, such assets
need only be sold after December 31, 2000. Whether this disparity was intentional is not clear from the
1997 Act's legislative history.
103. See I.R.C. § 11 (1994). Generally, most corporations find their income taxed at a flat rate of
35%. See id. Section 1201 provides, however, that the long-term rate applicable to corporations' capi-
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Whether capital gains should be taxed at preferential rates has been
the subject of a tax policy debate for many years."° Although a number
of commentators have rejected the capital gains preference as antithetical to sound tax policy,1°5 I believe nevertheless that continued recognition of the preference provides a solution to the problems of "bunching"
and "lock-in"'" and thus is supported by sound policy justifications. 7
The problems of bunching and lock-in will be discussed next.
1.

Bunching

The concept of bunching arises directly out of the realization provisions outlined previously.108 Recall that, primarily because of administrative feasibility concerns, capital gains or losses are "realized" only when
taxpayers sell or exchange capital assets. Accordingly, if taxpayers hold
capital assets for a number of years, any gains resulting from sales of
those assets will often reflect appreciation that has accrued over those
years. This cumulative gain, however, is taxed entirely in the year of sale.
Because the tax system is progressive, taxpayers could be forced into a
higher marginal tax bracket as a result of including several years' worth
of gain in income in the year of sale.1"

tal gains will be capped at 35% should the maximum tax rate applicable to other corporate income
ever exceed 35%. See id. § 1201.
104. For example, in the spring of 1993, the Tax Law Review devoted a 423-page volume to a
colloquium on capital gains. See Colloquium on CapitalGains, 48 TAx L. REV. 315 (1993).
105. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Commentary: A Capital Gains Preference Is Not EVEN a SecondBest Solution, 48 TAX L. REV. 381, 391 (1993) (suggesting that broadening the tax base and employing
a mark-to-market system for taxing gains would be simpler and more neutral than a capital gains preference); Joseph A. Snoe, Tax Simplification and Fairness:Four Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 60 ALB. L. REV. 61, 66-80 (1996) (concluding that a capital gains preference is no longer necessary).
106. See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932) ("[The capital gains preference was]
adopted to relieve the taxpayer from these excessive burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of
capital investments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conversions.").
107. A third policy justification favoring the capital gains preference is inflation. Because gains
generally accrue over a number of years, those gains often are not true economic gains; instead, they
are the result of inflationary pressures. It has been argued that the capital gains preference is necessary
to offset these purely inflationary gains. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
471-72 (3d ed. 1986). Yet most current tax scholars agree that the solution to inflationary gains is not
to provide preferences for capital gains but rather to index the bases of assets for inflation. See, e.g.,
BRADFORD, supra note 36, at 75-76; Halperin, supra note 86, at 509-14; Snoe, supra note 105, at 71-72.
108. See supra notes 68-97 and accompanying text; see also David Carris, Comment, Capital Gains
Taxation: A Full Circle?, 14 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 43,55 (1989).
109.
On grounds of fairness, a gain which has developed over many years, if taxed on realization, may put a
taxpayer in a much higher bracket than he would have been in if he could have been taxed on the
gains as they accrued. It is thus considered equitable to give a lower rate of tax on gains developing
over long periods in order to avoid the effects of having income bunched in the single year of realization. This point of equity was probably the principal argument for the original differential taxation of
capital gains in this country and is still regarded by many as the most significant one.
DAN THROOP SMITH, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 123 (1961); see also Blum, supra note 78, at 253 ("A
capital gain realized in a particular year may represent appreciation that took place over a span of
many years. To tax the whole gain as income in the year of realization would be manifestly unfair un-
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As early as 1932, the Treasury Department recognized the problem
bunching posed and considered alternatives designed to remedy it, such
as allowing taxpayers to spread gains over a number of years, as well as
excluding capital gains from income altogether:
The principal argument against taxing capital gains rests on the
grounds that such gains, unlike other income, may have accrued
over several years; and that to tax such gains at progressive rates in
the particular year in which they are realized is to impose an undue
and inequitable burden. This argument has much force. It will be
observed, however, that it does not apply at all to gains from the
sales of property which has been [sic] held a year or less, and is not
much more persuasive as to property held 2 years. Nevertheless, the
argument is sufficiently sound to suggest that, if the assets have
been held more than 1 or 2 years, steps should be taken either to
spread the profit in some way over the years during which the taxpayer owned it, or to provide for the taxation of the profit at some
flat rate. u °
The current capital gains preference is designed to remedy this
bunching problem by taxing capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary
income. This preference is, however, a relatively imprecise remedy to the
bunching problem."' As noted in the Treasury Department's statement
set forth above, the gain might have accrued fully in the year of sale, thus
not causing any bunching of gains over a period of years." 2 Nonetheless,
taxpayers would still be entitled to take full advantage of the capital
gains preference. Similarly, many taxpayers who enjoy large capital gains
are relatively wealthy and, therefore, find that their income is taxed at
the highest marginal tax rate even without including the capital gains in
income."' For these taxpayers, the progressive tax system does not force
der a system of progressive rates ....
");Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 328; William D.
Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital Gains, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 153, 154 (1983).

110. SUBCOMM. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 46, at 4. Contrary to the quotation in the text,
Professor William Popkin, a nationally recognized tax scholar, suggests that the real legislative purpose behind the capital gains preference was not to remedy tax inequities caused by bunching but instead to provide an economic incentive to engaging in risky investments. See Popkin, supra note 109,
at 154.
111. See Snoe, supra note 105, at 71. Professor Snoe argues that because the capital gains preference provides only rough justice with respect to the bunching problem, and inasmuch as tax rates are
currently not steeply progressive, the capital gains preference is no longer necessary as a remedy to the
problem of bunching. See id.
Similarly, Professors Cunningham and Schenk argue that the primary flaw inherent in the bunching
argument is its failure to consider the tax advantage that taxpayers enjoy as a result of deferring the
tax on their gains until sale. Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 328. They suggest that,
"[dlepending on the assumptions, the deferral resulting from the realization requirement may offset
the bunching effect completely." Id.
112. In Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965), the Supreme Court noted that "Congress
intended to afford capital gains treatment only in situations 'typically involving the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time, and thus to ameliorate the hardship of
taxation of the entire gain in one year."' Id at 572 (quoting Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp.,
Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960)).
113. See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 328 n.36. The authors cite several studies that
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them into a higher tax bracket. 1 4 Yet, despite the concerns that some
critics have expressed regarding the imprecision of the capital gains preference, the preference does relieve the burden of bunching in a number
of cases.
2.

The Lock-In Effect

Although the capital gains preference attempts to alleviate the
bunching problem, perhaps a more compelling policy justification for its
continued viability is its resolution of what most commentators term the
lock-in effect."' Because gains from the sale of capital assets are not
taxed until the assets are sold and the gains are realized, taxpayers fully
control the timing of this realization event. Taxpayers can postpone realizing their capital gains either until they are in a lower tax bracket or
until the government has reduced tax rates. They can also avoid tax on
the gain altogether by keeping the asset and transferring it to their heirs
at death." 6 Thus, the lock-in effect results from taxpayers' reluctance to
sell their assets and incur a tax liability on those sales." 7
If left unremedied, the lock-in effect creates two sets of adverse
economic consequences. First, the lock-in effect results in less revenue
for the government.
This is because the question of whether or not a capital gain will be
realized is entirely within the discretion of the taxpayer. If the rates
are too high, taxpayers will not dispose of their property. This will
result in the Government losing not only income taxes, but also
stamp taxes on transfers of property."'
illustrate which taxpayers reported the bulk of capital gains during a specified period. The authors
conclude that the taxpayers reporting most capital gains were already in the highest marginal tax
brackets, and bunching thus does not pose any significant problems. See id. at 328. Yet the statistics
cited by the authors do not appear to lead automatically to the conclusion that the taxpayers reporting
the largest percentage of capital gains were, in fact, in the highest marginal tax brackets.
114. See generally Andrews, supra note 36; at 1132-33 (suggesting that if the real problem with
capital gains was in fact bunching, "the sensible remedy would be one of spreading or averaging total
income over a period of years"). "Such a remedy would have no value or effect for regular capital gain
repeaters or for regular high-bracket taxpayers, who probably are the biggest beneficiaries of the present provisions." Id. (footnotes omitted).
115. See, e.g., Cummingham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 344 ("The most serious argument in favor of a capital gains preference is premised upon the so-called lock-in effect." (footnote omitted));
Snoe, supranote 105, at 77.
116. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1994). Under this provision, when a decedent transfers an asset to an heir,
the heir generally receives the asset with a basis equal to its fair market value at the time of the decedent's death. See id. Accordingly, any appreciation in the asset at the time of death will never be taxed.
See supra note 70. Studies indicate that approximately one-half of all capital gains are never taxed because of this stepped-up basis at death. See, e.g., MERVYN A. KING & DON FULLERTON, THE
TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL 221 (1984); see also Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at

344.
117. See, e.g., Snoe, supra note 105, at 76-77; see also Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 344
("The lock-in effect describes an investor's reluctance to incur a tax on realization of gains; it is a direct consequence of prior decisions to impose a realization requirement and not to tax gains at death."
(footnote omitted)).
118.

H.R. REP. NO. 77-2333, at 29 (1942), reprinted in 108 INTERNAL REVENUE ACmS OF THE
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Second, the lock-in effect prevents the flow of capital to its best
economical use.'19 As one scholar explained:
A sophisticated person would compare the financial return of selling the asset, paying the income tax... and investing the net proceeds in a profitable manner against retaining the asset, forgoing
tax liability, and receiving less than the optimum return on the retained asset. As part of this calculus, the taxpayer would also consider that recognition of all realized gain could be avoided by holding the asset until death and passing the property to heirs or
devisees with a stepped-up basis.12
Because the lock-in effect often prevents taxpayers from investing their
assets in new or productive enterprises, it results in economic inefficiency
in the marketplace."2 '
Accordingly, inasmuch as we want to encourage taxpayers to sell
less profitable assets and invest the proceeds in more economically productive assets, we must eliminate the lock-in effect that results from the
realization concept discussed previously.' The capital gains preference
is the primary vehicle to accomplish this goal.2 3 A capital gains preference reduces the tax burden associated with the sale or disposition of asUNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 29.
119. See id.; S. REP. No. 75-1567, at 6 (1938), reprinted in 103 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE

UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 6 ("[Aln excessive tax on capital gains freezes transactions and prevents the free flow of capital into productive investments. The effect of the present system of taxing capital gains is to prevent any individual with substantial capital from investing in new
enterprises. This is most unfortunate .... "); see also Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 344-46;
Snoe, supra note 105, at 76-78.
120. Snoe, supra note 105, at 76-77 (footnotes omitted).
For example, suppose T holds Asset #1 with a basis of $10 and a value of $500 in a world with a
flat 25% tax on income. The expected yield on this investment is 10% or $50. T has the opportunity to invest in Asset #2 which has an expected yield of 12%. If T sold Asset #1, he would pay
$100 in taxes, leaving only $400 to invest in Asset #2. Because a $400 investment in Asset #2 has
an expected yield of only $48, T will not change investments. The toll charge prevents T from diversifying his portfolio.
Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 344.
121.

See H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 29 (1942), reprinted in 108 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE

UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 29; see also SMITH, supra note 109, at 125; Andrews, supra note 36, at 1134 ("It is economically inefficient to have a tax that gives people an incentive not to
make otherwise desirable changes in investments."). For a more complete discussion of economic efficiency, see infra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
122. Of course, this solution presupposes that taxpayers will reinvest their assets in other investments. See Andrews, supra note 36, at 1134.
123. See Popkin, supra note 109, at 154-55. Many commentators have also suggested that eliminating the stepped-up basis at death is a critical second step to eliminating lock-in. See Cunningham &
Schenk, supra note 34, at 347; see also Snoe, supra note 105, at 82 (suggesting that eliminating the
stepped-up basis at death is one option for eliminating lock-in). Although I agree with this proposal, I
believe that reducing lock-in effect during taxpayers' lives via the capital gains preference is also necessary.
It is interesting to note that the provision allowing the stepped-up basis at death was repealed by
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872, but the repeal never became effective. The effective date of the repeal was postponed in the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-600, § 515, 92 Stat. 2763, 2884. The provision was ultimately repealed in the Crude Oil Windfall
Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229, 299, which reinstated the stepped-up
basis provisions.

HeinOnline -- 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1104 1999

No. 4]

THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CAPITAL LOSSES

1105

sets, thereby increasing the likelihood that taxpayers will sell their less
profitable investments and reinvest the proceeds in more profitable ventures, despite the imposition of a capital gains tax. Even with such a tax,
this reinvestment of assets would prove economically efficient.
I will concede the point made by many critics of the capital gains
preference that it is an imperfect solution to the problems of bunching
and lock-in. I contend, however, that until we can eliminate the administrative burdens that require maintaining the concept of realization, the
capital gains preference must remain an integral part of the income tax
system.

III. CURRENT Loss LIMITATIONS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Only after accepting the continued viability of progressivity, realization, and the capital gains preference, which together create the need for
loss limitations generally, can we turn to the primary focus of this article:
the deductibility of capital losses. This part of the article examines the
current system for limiting the deductibility of capital losses and outlines
the policy justifications proffered in favor of such limitations.
The scheme for determining whether sales or other dispositions of
property result in capital losses rather than ordinary losses is identical to
the scheme for determining capital gains. Thus, the property disposition
must qualify as a sale or exchange,124 and the asset sold or exchanged
must qualify as a capital asset."z If the capital asset has been held for one
year or less, the resulting loss would be a short-term capital loss; conversely, an asset held for more than one year would produce a long-term
capital loss.126
When individuals sell or otherwise exchange property and the
transaction produces short- or long-term capital losses, such losses can be
deducted on the individual's income tax return only to the extent of the
individual's capital gains plus up to $3,000 of ordinary income.127 Corpo124. See I.R.C. § 1222(2), (4) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998).
125. See id. A capital asset is defined in I.R.C. § 1221 to include all property, except five categories of noncapital assets: (1) stock in trade, inventory, or property held primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business; (2) depreciable personal property or real
property, if used in the taxpayer's trade or business; (3) copyrights, literary, musical, or artistic compositions, letters or memoranda created by the taxpayer; (4) accounts or notes receivable generated in
the taxpayer's trade or business; and (5) certain publications of the U.S. government. See I.R.C. § 1221
(1994); see also Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1988). It has long been
held that the definition of a capital asset should be construed narrowly so that capital gain or loss
treatment is only given in situations generally involving the realization of appreciation or depreciation
over a long period of time. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134
(1960).
126. See I.R.C. § 1222(2), (4) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998).
127. I.R.C. § 1211(b) provides:
In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets
shall be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such sales or exchanges, plus (if such losses
exceed such gains) the lower of(1) $3,000 ($1,500 in the case of a married individual filing a separate return), or
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rations, on the other hand, can deduct their short- or long-term capital
losses only to the extent of capital gains.128
The Code has always imposed limitations on the deductibility of
capital losses, with the exception of a brief six-year period following
World War I. In fact, under the first Internal Revenue Code, capital
losses were not deductible at all. 129 In 1916, capital losses were first allowed as a deduction but then only to the extent of capital gains. 3 The
Revenue Act of 1918 allowed for full deductibility of capital losses, 3' and
this full deductibility continued until 1924. At that time, limitations on
the deductibility of capital losses were again imposed, and these limitations provided that only 12.5% of an individual's capital losses could be
used as credits against the individual's income tax liability. 32 Moreover,
the 1924 Act also amended the Code to provide that individual taxpayers
could deduct capital losses only to the extent of capital gains.'33 In 1934,
Congress again amended the Code to provide that all taxpayers could
deduct capital losses against capital gains plus $2,000 of ordinary in(2) the excess of such losses over such gains.
I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1994).
It is important to note that, for any loss of an individual taxpayer to be deductible at all, it must
qualify as a trade or business loss, an investment loss, or a casualty loss. See I.R.C. § 165(c) (West 1988
& West Supp. 1998); see also Lemons v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 522, 533 (1997).
128. I.R.C. § 1211(a) provides that "[iln the case of a corporation, losses from sales or exchanges
of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent of gains from such sales or exchanges." I.R.C. §
1211(a) (1994).
For both individual and corporate taxpayers, the Code provides an elaborate mechanism for offsetting capital losses against capital gains. First, short-term capital losses are offset against short-term
capital gains, and long-term capital losses are offset against long-term capital gains. See I.R.C. § 1222
(5)-(8) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998). If this original netting process results in a net gain on one side
(short-term, for example) and a net loss on the other side (long-term, for example), then the net shortterm capital gain is offset against the net long-term capital loss. See id. § 1222 (9)-(11).
For corporate taxpayers, any net long- or short-term capital losses remaining after this complete
netting process cannot be deducted in the current year but can be carried back three years and forward five years and deducted against capital gains in those years, subject to the same netting process.
See id. § 1212(a)(1). For individual taxpayers, any net long- or short-term capital losses remaining after
the netting process can be used to offset up to $3,000 of the taxpayer's ordinary income, with net shortterm capital losses being first used to offset the ordinary income before net long-term capital losses
can be used as an offset. See I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1994). Any unused losses can be carried forward to future years indefinitely and can be deducted in those years, subject to the same limitations. See I.R.C. §
1212(b) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998).
129. See Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § 2(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167. For a detailed history of the deductibility of capital losses from the inception of the income tax until 1948, see Wells, supra note 98, at 1232.
130. See Act of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a), 39 Stat. 756, 759.
131. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a)(5), 40 Stat. 1057, 1067 (1919); see also H.R. REP.
No. 65-767, at 10 (1918), reprintedin 94 INTERNAL REVENUE Acrs OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950,
supra note 23, at 10. The House Report states that
[u]nder existing law, in transactions entered into for profit but not connected with the taxpayer's
business or trade, only the losses actually sustained therein during the year to an amount not exceeding the profits arising therefrom can be deducted. The proposed bill changes the provision of
existing law to allow the entire loss in such transaction to be deducted.
Id.
132. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 208(c), 43 Stat. 253,263 (1924).
133. See id. § 206(a)(2), 43 Stat. at 260; see also Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 112(g), 45 Stat.
791,818 (recodifying this limitation as I.R.C. § 117(a)(2) (1928)).
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come."3 Although Congress has tinkered with the deductibility of capital
losses since 1934, the general scheme of allowing capital losses to offset
capital gains plus some dollar amount
of ordinary income has remained
35
relatively constant since that time.1
It is generally agreed that permitting the deductibility of capital
losses is necessary if the government is attempting to induce taxpayers to
invest in risky undertakings. 13 For example, a seminal study undertaken
by two prominent economists, Evsey Domar and Richard Musgrave,
demonstrated that if capital losses were allowed to be deducted in full,
such deductibility would encourage taxpayers to engage in risk-taking to
a greater extent than if no tax were imposed on capital gains or losses. 37
As one noted capital loss scholar has stated, Domar and Musgrave's "basic conclusion that proportional taxation with loss offsets encourages
risk-taking is now widely accepted by economists."'38 Yet capital losses
have been deductible in full for only a brief six-year period during the
history of the income tax. Accordingly, it is reasonable to ask what policy
considerations, if any, justify limiting the deductibility of capital losses.
Three policy justifications have been advanced over the years in support
of these limitations: parallel treatment of gains and losses, cherrypicking,
and bunching. Each justification will be examined briefly.
A.

ParallelTreatment of CapitalGains and Losses

Because taxpayers receive preferential tax treatment on their capital gains, Congress long ago determined that it would be incongruous to
allow capital losses to offset ordinary income, which is generally taxed at
a higher rate.139 Therefore, to counterbalance the preferential tax rate accorded capital gains, it was necessary to provide an overall limitation on
the deductibility of capital losses, balancing the total tax benefit granted
134. See Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117,48 Stat. 680, 714.
135. For a more in-depth discussion of the history of the limitations on deductibility of capital
losses, see Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Deductibility by Individuals of Capital Losses Under the Federal
Income Tax, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 291,291-92 (1973), and also CRS REPORT, supra note 98.
136. See, e.g., DAVID, supra note 93, at 140 ("[T]he deductibility of losses has a profound effect on
the willingness of private investors to undertake risky investments."); SMITH, supra note 109, at 151
("[Dieductibility of losses is an effective way to use government power to offset inherent barriers
against particular forms of investment which it has desired to encourage on social or economic
grounds."); see also Warren, supra note 135, at 297-98 ("[T]axpayers would be more willing to take
substantial risks, subjecting any profit to the possibility of taxation, if losses could be deducted from
other income.").
137. See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and RiskTaking, 58 Q.J. ECON. 388 (1944), reprinted in IX READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, supra
note 72, at 493, and in RICHARD A.

MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 108

(1986); see also Warren, supra note 135, at 299 ("In addition, the tax savings made possible by the deferral effect of currently deducting losses while postponing gains could make risk taking even more
attractive than the Domar-Musgrave hypothesis would indicate." (footnotes omitted)).
138. Warren, supranote 135, at 298-99 n.29; see also Michael J.Stepek, Note, The Tax Reform Act
of 1986: Simplificationand the Future Viability of Accrual Taxation, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 779, 784

n.36 (1987).
139. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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to taxpayers on their capital gains and losses. As Professor Smith, a former deputy to the Secretary of the Treasury, concluded, "it is reasonable
that if capital gains are given a more liberal tax treatment than ordinary
income, capital losses should be treated less liberally than ordinary
14
losses.""
Although it seems inherently logical for there to be parallel tax
treatment between capital gains and losses, it becomes problematic to
implement this parallelism in practice. As noted scholar Alvin Warren
concluded, the inherent difficulty arises because those engaged in the
debate have not agreed on the definition of what constitutes "parallel"
treatment.141 Professor Warren suggested three alternative types of capital gain and loss parallelism.142
The first type of parallelism, and that currently employed in the
Code, is "inclusion/deduction parallelism," in which the dollar amount of
capital gains included in income equals the dollar amount of capital
losses deducted from income.143 As discussed previously, the current system of income taxation provides that capital losses can be used to offset
only capital gains plus up to $3,000 of ordinary income for individual
taxpayers. Thus, the current system roughly approximates this inclusion/deduction parallelism, but the addition of $3,000 of capital loss that
can offset ordinary income slightly skews the treatment of gains and
losses. Commentators have defended this type of parallelism on the
grounds that "capital losses provide deductions from income to the same
extent that capital gains give rise to inclusions in income.""
The primary criticism of inclusion/deduction parallelism is its failure
to account for the possibility that taxpayers might have realized true
economic losses and yet are unable to receive any tax benefits because
they do not have corresponding capital gains against which to offset the
losses. Accordingly, this type of parallelism can be attacked on both fundamental fairness and economic efficiency grounds.145
A second type of parallel treatment of capital gains and losses, referred to by Professor Warren as "liability/savings parallelism,"'" provides generally that the amount of tax savings resulting from the deduction of a capital loss against income should equal the tax liability
resulting from the inclusion of a capital gain in income. 47 Citing a Treasury Department study, Warren explained that the problem inherent in
liability/savings parallelism is that it could only be accomplished by use
140.
141.
142.
143.

SMITH, supra note 109, at 149.
See Warren, supra note 135, at 304.
See id. at 304-07.
See id. at 305.

144.

1 AMERICAN LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE:

X232(c), at 345 (1954); see also Warren,supra note 135, at 306.
145.

See infra Part IV.B.

146.

See Warren, supra note 135, at 304.

147.

See id.
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of a flat rate tax or through a tax credit:
Assuming for the moment that ordinary income does not fluctuate,
realizing net capital gains of a sufficient magnitude would push a
taxpayer into a higher tax bracket while realizing net capital losses
of a sufficient magnitude would put him into a lower bracket. Consequently, equal amounts of gain and loss could have different degrees of tax impact: because of the graduated rate structure, realization of a net gain could result in a greater increase in tax liability
than the reduction in tax liability occasioned by realization of an
equivalent net loss.'48
Although Professor Warren and the Treasury Department correctly
recognized the inability to effectuate liability/savings parallelism under
the then-current tax scheme without using a tax credit, the Code today
does not present the same barriers. Because capital gains are generally
taxed at a flat rate of 20% irrespective of the taxpayer's marginal tax rate
on ordinary income,"' the problems associated with implementing a parallel tax scheme using liability/savings parallelism disappear under the
current Code. The proposal outlined in part IV of this article designs just
such a model.
The third type of parallel treatment of capital gains and losses presented in Warren's article is "accrual/realization parallelism.' 50 This type
of parallelism treats capital gains and losses as if they had been taxed under an accrual-type tax system (as the gains and losses accrue each year)
rather than under a realization system. It is subject to the same criticisms
waged against an accrual- or accretion-type tax system generally, as outlined in part II of this article. Thus, to achieve true parallelism, taxpayers
would be required to obtain a valuation of their assets each year so that
gains and losses that have accrued with respect to each asset could be determined annually. The administrative complexities associated with such
a system would render it nearly impossible to implement.
Thus, although tax scholars have been unable to agree which type of
parallelism best justifies the imposition of limitations on the deductibility
of capital losses, it is relatively well settled that parallel treatment of capital gains and losses generally remains a primary policy justification for
such limitations.

148. Id. at 305 (citing U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL
GAINS AND LOSSES 59-69 (1951)).
149. Of course, this tax scheme is not correct with respect to taxpayers in the 15 % bracket, whose
capital gains are taxed at a flat rate of 10%. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the fact that a flat tax rate is imposed on capital gains irrespective of income levels, with this limited exception, would make it easier to surmount the barriers associated with liability/savings parallelism outlined in the Warren article. See infra Part IV.
150. See Warren, supra note 135, at 306-07.
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Cherrypicking

Many tax scholars argue that the most compelling policy justification for placing limitations on the deductibility of capital losses is to limit
"cherrypicking" by taxpayers.151 As discussed above, taxpayers can control the realization of capital gains and losses by carefully timing the date
of a sale or exchange of their capital assets.'52 Without a limitation on the
deductibility of capital losses, taxpayers could postpone realizing their
capital gains while, at the same time, selling their capital loss assets and
using those losses to offset their ordinary income.'53 This selective realization of capital losses, but not capital gains, is termed cherrypicking in
tax parlance.
As early as 1924, Congress recognized that cherrypicking was indeed a drain on tax revenues. In the legislative history of the Revenue
Act of 1924, which imposed significant limitations on the deductibility of
capital losses,'54 one group proposing that capital gains and losses be disregarded altogether in calculating taxable income observed the following:
In support of the contention that losses in the sales of capital assets
are employed as deductions from taxable income in a much greater
measure than are the gains from the sale of capital assets added to
taxable income, we cite the following table presented to the Ways
and Means Committee of the House of Representatives by Undersecretary of the Treasury S. Parker Gilbert, at a hearing held before
that committee of the Sixty-Seventh Congress, fourth session, on H.
R. 13412, on Monday, January 8, 1923. [The chart, which is omitted
here, analyzes the aggregate incomes of the fifty largest individual
taxpayers for 1920, together with taxes paid thereon.]
It will be observed that this summary of the income of the 50
largest tax payers [sic] for the taxable year 1920, showing gross income of $99,914,000, establishes that of this income, $1,500,000 results in the sale of capital assets whereas deductible losses on the
sale of capital assets amount to $11,650,000. This indicates that at
least this type of taxpayers [sic] do not take their capital gains in
taxable form, but frequently keep the property and allow the gains
to accumulate. On the other hand, when they have capital losses,
151. See Scarborough, supra note 96, at 680-81 ("It is widely agreed that the principal justification
for limiting capital losses is to prevent selective realization, or 'cherrypicking,' of losses by taxpayers
who have unrealized gains."); see also Douglas A. Kahn, Section 338 and Its Foolish Consistency
Rules- The Hobgoblin of Little Minds, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 31, 57-58 (1994) ("'Cherrypicking' of
losses is endemic to our entire realization-based income tax system.").
152. See supranotes 68-71 and accompanying text.
153.

See Fred W. Peel, Jr., CapitalLosses: Falling Short on Fairnessand Simplicity, 17 U. BALT. L.

REV. 418, 421 (1988); see also DAVID, supra note 93, at 140 ("This asymmetric treatment encourages
realization of losses in early years and gains in later tax years to reduce and defer tax liability .... The
limitation on deductibility of net capital losses has been viewed as a necessary safeguard against tax
avoidance by this means.").
154. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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such taxpayers take them advantageously in order to reduce taxable
income.155
Moreover, the Code provision permitting a stepped-up basis of appreciated assets at death exacerbates the cherrypicking problem. 56 Because, in the absence of loss limitations, taxpayers can recognize capital
losses currently while never recognizing capital gains and can escape recognition altogether through the stepped-up
basis provisions, the need for
1 57
loss limitations becomes even greater.
C.

Bunching of CapitalLosses

The final, often overlooked, policy justification for imposing limitations on the deductibility of capital losses is the concept of bunching. Just
as with capital gains,158 losses can accrue over a number of years. Yet because of the realization concept, taxpayers realize their losses all at once
in the year of sale. Large capital losses realized in a single taxable year
could enable taxpayers to reduce taxable income enough to move into a
lower tax bracket. As Professor Blum explained, "[l]ike capital gains,
capital losses frequently develop over many years. If taxpayers had free
rein in choosing the year of deduction by selecting the time of realization, they would be in a position to take their losses in high tax years and
their gains in low ones." '59 For this reason, Congress has always considered loss limitations to be necessary to offset this "bunching" effect.
Thus, the three primary policy justifications most often posited in
favor of limiting the deductibility of capital losses are parallelism, cherrypicking, and bunching. Yet tax scholars cannot agree on the extent to
which each of these concepts actually justifies the imposition of loss limitations."6 The section that follows begins by critically analyzing these
policy justifications for limiting the deductibility of capital losses and
then proposes an alternative scheme for imposing loss limitations that
better comports with the true reasons giving rise to the need for such
limitations.
155. Revenue Act of 1924: Hearingson H.R. 6715 Before the Comm. on Finance, 68th Cong. 33839 (1924) (brief of the National Association of Real Estate Boards), reprinted in 2 INTERNAL
REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 338-39.

156. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1994); see also supra note 116 and accompanying text.
157. See Blum, supra note 78, at 254 (arguing that allowing taxpayers to recognize losses while
deferring the realization of gains "would stack the odds too much in favor of taxpayers; and the whipsawing potential would be unconscionably great if unrealized gains escaped tax at death"). See generally Peel, supranote 153, at 422.
158. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
159. Blum, supra note 78, at 254. Under certain circumstances, however, taxpayers could have an
incentive to spread, rather than bunch, their losses. For example, a taxpayer with a large loss who is
consistently in the highest tax bracket might want to use only enough of the loss to offset income in
that highest bracket, retaining the remaining loss to do the same in future years. Nevertheless, bunching of losses into a single tax year remains a problem in a large number of cases.
160.

See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, Commentary: Deferring Tax Losses with an Expanded § 1211, 48

TAX L. REV. 719, 720-21 (1993); Scarborough, supra note 96, at 680-81; Warren, supra note 135, at
300-16.
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IV. A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CAPITAL LOSSES
Studies have demonstrated that capital losses must be deductible in
some form as an economic incentive to encourage taxpayers to invest in
risky ventures.' Risk investment, in turn, fuels economic growth. 62 The
few tax scholars who have critically analyzed the capital loss limitations
all agree that the current system is flawed and in need of radical revision. 63 Some call for the complete deductibility of capital losses without
limitation;"6 others propose an accretion-type tax system in which gains
and losses would be taxed annually. 65 These proposals, however, fail in
one of two respects. Those advocating full deductibility of capital losses
do not comprehensively account for the policy considerations underlying
the need for capital loss limitations generally. Conversely, those proposals that seek to move to an accretion-type tax, although possibly justified
in a theoretical world, fail to accept the practical limitations that make
those proposals completely unworkable in the real world."6
This part of the article designs a new paradigm for the deductibility
of capital losses, one that is both administratively feasible and also addresses the underlying policy justifications for the imposition of loss limitations. It begins by addressing those problems inherent in the current
loss limitation system, focusing primarily on how the current system inadequately treats the policy concerns of parallelism and cherrypicking' 67
It then sets forth a new proposal for limiting the deductibility of capital
161. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 109, at 125; see also infra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 75, at 802 ("[T]he limit on the amount of capital losses that a
taxpayer may deduct in one year should be abandoned."); Peel, supra note 153, at 432 ("The Code is
still burdened, however, by capital gain and loss distinctions that still affect individual taxpayers who
have substantial capital losses .... "); Scarborough, supra note 96, at 701 ("[T]he current capital loss
limitation both fails to control selective realization of losses, and thus encourages certain types of risky
positions, and discourages other types of risky positions by creating unusable losses."); Warren, supra
note 135, at 292 ("This article discusses the appropriate tax treatment for capital losses realized by individual taxpayers, given the current preferential treatment of capital gains .... ").
164. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 72, at 209 ("[Tlhere should be no limitations whatever upon the
deduction of bona fide losses .... One-sided restrictions as to losses are too ridiculous and inequitable
for serious consideration."); Peel, supra note 153, at 432 ("Virtually all of the complications can be
eradicated if Congress is willing to take the additional step of allowing capital losses in full in the same
manner that ordinary losses are now treated."); Warren, supra note 135, at 297 ("[Tlhe primary rationale for making capital losses fully deductible is in the economic incentive for risk taking it would
provide.").
165. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 75, at 737 (suggesting that the first step in determining tax is to
"[e]stimate the accretion or decretion in an asset's market price for each period the taxpayer held (or
produced) the asset, based on its value at the time of the realization event").
166. As discussed earlier, even Henry Simons, a principal architect of the ideal income tax base,
recognized the administrative unfeasibility of moving away from a realization-based tax system. See
SIMONS, supra note 72, at 207-08; see also supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
167. The current loss limitation system addresses the policy concern of bunching in a haphazard
way, overcompensating for bunching under certain circumstances (such as when the loss accrued over
a relatively short period of time) and undercompensating for the problem in other situations. Nevertheless, the present system does alleviate bunching in a large number of cases. Accordingly, I believe
that the present system, although subject to certain criticisms with respect to bunching, is not inherently flawed in that respect; therefore, I do not attack it in this section.
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losses, justifying the proposal on both policy and feasibility grounds. Finally, this part will respond to potential criticisms that might be waged
against the new capital loss paradigm, including that it benefits wealthier
taxpayers and adds further complexity to the Code.
A.

Problems Inherent in the CurrentLoss Limitation System

Recall that under the current loss limitation system, individual taxpayers can deduct their capital losses to the extent of their capital gains
plus up to $3,000 of ordinary income; corporations, on the other hand,
can deduct losses only to the extent of capital gains."6 Congress justifies
the provisions allowing all taxpayers, both corporate and individual, to
offset capital losses against capital gains on the grounds that such a limitation provides parallel treatment of gains and losses, prevents cherrypicking, and eliminates any advantage caused by the bunching of losses
in a single tax year. 69 The discussion that follows, however, demonstrates
that the current system falls short of the mark in alleviating these policy
concerns.
1.

Parallelism

As discussed previously, the current capital loss limitation system is
roughly based on the concept of inclusion/deduction parallelism, in which
the dollar amount of capital gains included in gross income equals the
dollar amount of capital losses deducted from gross income."' The current system only roughly approximates inclusion/deduction parallelism
because it allows up to $3,000 of capital losses to offset an individual taxpayer's ordinary income. Congress justifies this provision on fairness
grounds--it prevents hardship in the case of individuals having only a
small amount of income and sporadic losses.'7 1 Yet the very existence of
this $3,000 de minimis provision undermines, at least in part, the concept
of inclusion/deduction parallelism upon which the current loss limitation
system is based.
Moreover, under this type of parallelism, taxpayers can deduct their
capital losses only if they have capital gains with which to offset them.
Thus, a principal criticism of inclusion/deduction parallelism is that taxpayers who have engaged in risky investment ventures and incurred true
economic losses are unable to receive any tax benefits on account of
those losses if they have not also realized corresponding capital gains. As
168. See I.R.C. § 1211(a)-(b) (1994). For a more complete discussion of the current limitations on
the deductibility of capital losses, see supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 140-60 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the three types of parallelism.
171. See S. REP. No. 73-558, at 12 (1934), reprinted in 100 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 12; S. REP. No. 77-1631, at 117 (1942), reprinted in 108
INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 117.
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a result, inclusion/deduction parallelism can lead to economic inefficiency in two distinct ways. First, taxpayers whose investments have resulted in capital losses without any offsetting capital gains would be disinclined to sell the loss property and reinvest the proceeds from the sale
in more economically productive ventures. If taxpayers are not entitled
to receive any tax benefits on account of those losses, they would likely
decide to keep assets invested in the loss venture until the taxpayers have
capital gains against which to offset those losses in the hope that the investments might turn around and become more profitable in the future.
Second, because taxpayers recognize that their capital losses are
economically worthless in the absence of offsetting capital gains, they
might choose not to invest in risky ventures that might produce losses at
all. This would be an unfortunate result because risk investments spur
economic growth in society.'72
The final concern stemming from the concept of parallelism, as reflected in the current loss limitation system, is that it is inconsistent with
traditional notions of fundamental fairness. Recall that under the guise
of parallelism, limitations are placed upon the deductibility of capital
losses to compensate the government for allowing capital gains to be
taxed at reduced rates.173 Yet, under the current capital gain and loss system, the deductibility of capital losses is limited even in those numerous
situations in which capital gains are not accorded preferential treatment.
For example, if corporations realize long-term capital gains, they will be
taxed on those gains at the same rates that apply to their ordinary income.' 74 But if those corporations incur capital losses, those losses can be
deducted only against their capital gains,'75 despite the fact that the government lost no revenue when the corporations included capital gains in
gross income.
Similarly, in the Tax Reform Act of 1986,176 Congress eliminated all
preferential tax rates previously accorded capital gains; even individuals'
capital gains were taxed at the same rates as their ordinary income. 77
Even though this system was in place for several years, 7 ' individuals
See SMITH, supra note 109, at 125.
See H.R. REP. No. 77-2333, at 30 (1942), reprinted in 108 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 29; 8UBCOMM. OF COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 75TH
CONG., REPORT ON A PROPOSED REVISION OF THE REVENUE LAWS 47 (Comm. Print 1938), reprinted
172.
173.

in 21 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 47 (stating that

capital losses cannot be offset against ordinary income, except with very narrow limits, "as a necessary
and salutary safeguard of the income-tax revenue").
174. See I.R.C. § 11 (1994).
175. See id. § 1211(a).
176. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
177. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 178-80 (Comm. Print 1987).
178. Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 generally took effect in 1987, the two-tier tax rate system (15% and 28%) did not become fully effective until 1988. From 1988 until 1990, capital gains were
taxed at the same rates as ordinary income. In 1990, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1403-04, Congress added the 31% tax bracket for
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were still subject to limitations on the deductibility of their capital losses.
Thus, individuals recognizing only long-term capital gains would pay tax
on those gains at the same rate as any ordinary income, thereby depriving the government of no lost tax revenue. Conversely, individuals recognizing only capital losses were generally unable to deduct those
losses,'79 ostensibly to protect the government's tax revenue base. This
sort of asymmetrical treatment of gains and losses is clearly inconsistent
with notions of fundamental fairness upon which the concept of parallelism is based."8 Accordingly, although parallelism remains a viable policy
justification for loss limitations generally, the inclusion/deduction parallelism embodied in the present system is quite flawed. The proposal contained in the next section of this article is based on the concept of liability/savings parallelism, which provides a richer and more economically
sound policy justification for capital loss limitations.18'
2.

Cherrypicking

Although the lack of parallelism is a real concern that needs to be
addressed by loss limitations, the foregoing discussion illustrates that the
current loss limitation system is ill-equipped to meet parallelism concerns. Conversely, although the system is well-designed to eliminate
cherrypicking, cherrypicking is not a problem that a loss limitation system should address.
Recall that cherrypicking is a shorthand term for the concern that
taxpayers can postpone the realization of their capital gains while currently realizing their capital losses and offsetting them against other income."8 Although it is undisputed that some taxpayers engage in cherrypicking, there are four reasons why the practice should not be the basis

ordinary income, even though the maximum capital gains tax rate remained at 28%, thereby creating a
maximum capital gains preference of 3%. Then, in 1993, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(a), 107 Stat. 312, 457-59, Congress added two additional
tax brackets for individual taxpayers, the 36% and 39.6% brackets, thereby creating a maximum capital gains preference of 11.6%.
179. Of course, taxpayers could offset up to $3,000 of those capital losses against ordinary income,
but that hardly balances out the inequities inherent in the system.
180. The fact that Congress retained limitations on the deductibility of capital losses even in the
absence of parallelism concerns strongly suggests, of course, that Congress views cherrypicking, discussed supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text, as its primary concern. I disagree, however, for the
reasons outlined in the following section.
Some commentators might argue that the present tax system does not reflect parallelism generally.
For example, if a taxpayer sells his vacation home or boat at a gain, he is required to include that gain
in income. On the other hand, if the same taxpayer sells the vacation home or boat at a loss, he has
suffered a personal loss under the Code and cannot deduct that loss against any of his taxable income.
See I.R.C. § 165(c) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1988). Yet, the fact that certain aspects of the present
Code evidence fundamental unfairness and a lack of parallelism under certain circumstances should
not be an argument against striving for parallelism generally.
181. See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
182. For a more complete discussion of cherrypicking, see supra notes 151-57 and accompanying
text.
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upon which a loss limitation system, like the one currently in place, is
structured.
First, capital losses are real economic losses.183 Even Congress recognizes that "[tihe losses [investors] have suffered are decidedly real
losses.... The shrinkage in the value of these investments is in every
sense of the word a true loss actually sustained by the investor."' "a4 If the
Haig-Simons notion of an ideal income tax base defines income as a taxpayer's consumption plus changes in net worth over time, implicit in that
definition is the notion that true economic losses reduce a taxpayer's income. Thus, limiting the deductibility of capital losses to encourage taxpayers to sell their gain-producing property is antithetical to the HaigSimons ideal income tax base."' Moreover, to the extent that an argument can be made that a capital loss is not a true economic loss in a particular case, Congress has expended considerable time and energy to disallow the deductibility of those losses as sham losses."a8
The second and perhaps even more compelling argument against
using cherrypicking as a policy justification for loss limitations is that the
concept of cherrypicking assumes that taxpayers have both capital losses
and capital gains and are selectively realizing their losses while postponing the realization of their gains. In reality, however, not all taxpayers
have both unrealized capital gains and capital losses in their investment
portfolios. It violates notions of fundamental fairness to design a loss
limitation system applicable to all taxpayers that is aimed at modifying
the behavior of only a fraction of those taxpayers. 87 Moreover, if one of
183. Schedular selective limitations generally disallow deductions for true economic costs as
well as for tax preferences. For example ... the capital loss denies deductions for losses that, considered in isolation, unquestionably are economic. The argument that selective limitations move
us further from Haig-Simons conformity plainly is more difficult to make when the disallowed
deduction is a tax preference.
Daniel Shaviro. Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1203 n.60 (1989); see
also Scarborough, supra note 96, at 720.
184. S. REP. No. 72-665, at 10 (1932), reprinted in 99 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 1909-1950. supra note 23, at 10.
185. See Warren, supra note 135, at 293 (noting that under the Haig-Simons definition of income,
"capital losses are negative income, just as capital gains are positive income").
186. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 465 (1994) (the at-risk rules); 469 (the passive loss rules); 704(d) (the partnership basis limitation rules); 1091 (the wash sales rules). In addition, as Professor Warren recognized, even though the tax laws have been quick to respond to taxpayers' creative attempts to manufacture fictitious capital losses, the problem of sham losses arises irrespective of whether the losses are
unlimited in deductibility or can be offset only against capital gains. See Warren, supra note 135, at
309.
187. As early as 1932, the Treasury Department recognized that a provision permitting capital
losses to be deducted only against capital gains was unjust as it applied to the myriad taxpayers who
had no capital gains with which to offset such losses:
[W]e do not know how to remedy that particular abuse [of allowing taxpayers to use their capital
losses to offset ordinary income without selling their capital gain property] without doing some
injustice, and I am afraid some people have got to suffer because of the general abuse of the
privilege by many other taxpayers.
Revenue Act of 1932: Hearings on H. R. 10236 Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 72d Cong. 31 (1932)
(statement of Ogden L. Mills, Secretary of the Treasury), reprinted in 10 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS
OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 31; see also Peel, supra note 153, at 419 ("Restric-
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the overarching goals of the capital gain and loss system is to promote
investment, preventing unfortunate investors who fail to realize offsetting gains from deducting capital losses would certainly have a negative
impact on that goal."s
When tax scholars justify cherrypicking as a policy concern underlying the need for loss limitations, they paint an idyllic picture in which
taxpayers have the best of both worlds: using losses to offset income currently, while at the same time postponing any tax on the income inherent
in appreciated property. Yet in reality there is, in fact, a serious risk associated with the game of cherrypicking. Consider, for example, this alltoo-real example of the risks inherent in cherrypicking. I purchased stock
in Compaq Computers in 1997. It appeared to be a solid investment; the
stock crept slowly upwards so that by the end of 1997, I had a sizable gain
(that is, sizable for me) in my investment. I decided not to sell the stock
at the end of that year because I did not want to include the gain in income in 1997. During 1998, Compaq decided to expand through acquisition, and the costs associated with those acquisitions took a toll on its
stock price. Thus, during 1998, I saw my stock steadily decrease in value,
reminding me of the clear risks associated with cherrypicking. Although I
am happy to report that my investment appears to be rebounding, it is a
myth to suggest that taxpayers who engage in selective realization of
their losses without a corresponding realization of their gains do achieve
the best of both worlds. There is a significant downside to cherrypicking,
and that risk should act as a deterrent to such behavior in most circumstances.
Finally, cherrypicking is not an appropriate policy basis for loss limitations because it is not the underlying problem. Cherrypicking is instead
the result of three interrelated causes that work together to form the root
of the evil that is cherrypicking. First, although not all capital gains arise
out of the sale of stock or other securities, it has been estimated that 85%
of all capital gains come from these sources.'89 Accordingly, one of the
underlying problems giving rise to cherrypicking is that corporations traditionally have failed to distribute their corporate earnings on a regular
basis."g If the income tax laws can be better designed to penalize corpotion of one taxpayer's use of an economic loss cannot be justified by pointing to another taxpayer's
benefit from special treatment of capital gains.").
188. See, e.g., Land, supra note 71, at 51. Professor Land believes that disallowing the deductibility of capital losses against ordinary income:
is not merely offensive to notions of horizontal and vertical equity; it also makes investing riskier.
The tax law promises deferral and a favorable rate to investment winners, but denies a tax benefit
to the losers. This magnification of risk should be a serious concern to those who want the tax law
to promote investment.
Id.; see also Scarborough, supra note 96, at 681 ("[T]he problem of unusable losses is a problem of behavior distortion; the limitation may discourage certain investments and risk management techniques.").
189.

See SIMONS, supra note 72, at 157 n.4.

190. See id. at 157; see also CURTIS J. BERGER & PETER J. WIEDENBECK, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 15 (1989) ("On average, U.S. corporations distribute less than half of
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rations for retaining their earnings rather than distributing them to
shareholders,19' there would be little taxpayer incentive to engage in
cherrypicking because there would be little, if any, gain inherent in taxpayers' stock, as all of the corporation's profits would be taxed currently
to its shareholders in the form of dividends."9 Similarly, the realization
concept, discussed previously,'93 coupled with the stepped-up basis at
death, 94 are the real problems that cause taxpayers to engage in cherrypicking. And although scholars have called for the elimination of the
stepped-up basis at death for a number of years, 95 the realization concept
will remain firmly embedded in the income tax system for purposes of
administrative feasibility."9 It is entirely possible that many of the concerns associated with cherrypicking would be alleviated by encouraging
corporations to distribute their profits currently and eliminating the
stepped-up basis at death.
This section has taken the somewhat controversial position that
cherrypicking should not be a compelling policy justification for imposing limitations on the deductibility of capital losses. As noted earlier,
many scholars argue that the principal justification for eliminating capital
losses is to prevent cherrypicking.' 9 I have demonstrated, however, that
cherrypicking, which is an inherently risky undertaking, is based on the
faulty assumption that all taxpayers have both unrealized losses and
gains. In addition, disallowing the deductibility of true economic losses to
taxpayers having no capital gains will discourage investment, which is
contrary to one of the principal goals of the capital gains preference generally. Finally, attacking two of the underlying causes of cherrypicking,
undistributed corporate earnings and the stepped-up basis at death,
should go a long way toward alleviating this negative taxpayer behavior.

their net income to shareholders in the form of cash or property (other than the corporation's own
stock)."); POSNER, supranote 107, at 470.
191. There are, of course, mechanisms currently in place in the Code to encourage corporations to
distribute their earnings annually, such as the accumulated earnings tax and the personal holding company tax, in which a corporation's undistributed earnings and undistributed personal holding company
income, respectively, are taxed at the highest individual rates. See I.R.C. §§ 531, 541 (1994). Yet these
provisions, as currently designed, merely act as a trap for the unwary. Savvy tax planners can work
around them.
192. Corporate distributions to shareholders are taxed to them as dividends to the extent of the
corporation's current and accumulated earnings and profits. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (West 1988 & West
Supp. 1998); I.R.C. § 316(a) (1994). The concept of earnings and profits is set forth in § 312 of the
Code, although never defined. See I.R.C. § 312 (1994).
193. See supranotes 68-97 and accompanying text.
194. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1994); see also supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
195. See supranote 123.
196. For a more complete discussion of the need for realization for purposes of administrative
feasibility, see supra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., Kahn, supranote 151, at 57-58; Scarborough, supra note 96, at 680-81.
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B.

Designing a Better Loss Limitation System

Because the present loss limitation system is inherently flawed, it
needs to be repealed and replaced with a new system that is more theoretically sound. This new system must further the twin policy considerations of parallelism and the avoidance of bunching. Moreover, the system
should be fundamentally fair to all taxpayers and encourage investor
risk-taking by promoting economic efficiency. Finally, such a system
must be politically feasible; that is, it must be designed in such a manner
that it has a reasonable likelihood of success in Congress. Otherwise, this
proposal, like so many others that have come before it, will be relegated
to a mere law review citation rather than being a foundation upon which
the tax system is improved.
This section proposes a new paradigm for limiting the deductibility
of capital losses. The proposal itself is really quite simple; in application,
however, the proposal adds further complexity to the already cumbersome Internal Revenue Code. The complexity concern is addressed at
the end of this article.198
Under this proposal, capital losses' could be used to offset any
type of income, including wages and investment income taxed at ordinary income rates; however, the benefits that taxpayers derive from deducting these losses against income otherwise taxed at ordinary rates
would be capped at the tax rate applicable had the capital losses instead
been corresponding capital gains. Two simple examples illustrate this basic premise.
In the first example, assume that T, a single taxpayer, purchased 100
shares of stock of Widget Corporation for $10,000 on January 2, 1997. By
June of 1998, 7s stock in Widget had dropped in value to $6,000, and he
°
sold the stock at that time, realizing a $4,000 long-term capital loss.2
During 1998, T earned $75,000 in wages from his job and had no other
income. Ignoring any deductions to which T would otherwise be entitled
(for ease of calculation), his wage income would be taxed at a maximum
rate of 31% for 1998. Thus, had 7s $4,000 long-term capital loss instead
been a long-term capital gain, it would have been taxed at a flat 20%
rate.2 ° 1 Accordingly, under this new loss limitation paradigm, T's $4,000
198. See infra notes 282-91 and accompanying text.
199. When I speak of capital losses throughout the remainder of this article, I refer only to those
capital losses that are otherwise deductible under § 165(c) of the Code. See I.R.C. § 165(c) (West 1988
& West Supp. 1998). Thus, losses incurred on the sale or exchange of a personal-use asset, such as a
recreational boat or vehicle or a principal residence, which are not currently deductible under § 165(c),
would not be deductible under my proposal. The issue of whether such losses should be deductible is a
full and robust topic best left to another day and article.
200. Because the Widget stock was held for the production of income, it was a capital asset in T's
hands. See I.R.C. § 1221 (1994). Moreover, because 7's disposition of the stock constituted a sale or
exchange of the capital asset, the resulting loss was a capital loss. See id. § 1222. Finally, T had held the
Widget stock for more than one year before disposing of it; therefore, the resulting capital loss was
long term in nature. See I.R.C. § 1222(4) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998).
201. Recall that not all long-term capital gains are taxed at a 20% rate for taxpayers in the 28%
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loss could be used to offset $4,000 of his wage income, but the benefit of
this offset would be capped at a 20% tax savings. Therefore, because T's
wage income would otherwise have been taxed at a 31% rate, T would be
required to pay an 11% tax on that income (representing the differential
between the 31% ordinary income rate on that $4,000 less the 20% rate
accorded to long-term capital gains).
In the second scenario, assume the same facts except that T purchased his Widget Corporation stock on January 2, 1998, instead of
January 2, 1997. Thus, when T sold his stock in June of 1998, his resulting
$4,000 capital loss was short-term rather than long-term in nature. 2°3 Had
this $4,000 short-term capital loss instead been a $4,000 short-term capital gain, the gain would have been taxed at T's otherwise applicable ordinary income tax rate of 31%. Accordingly, under the new loss limitation paradigm, T would be entitled to offset the $4,000 capital loss
against his ordinary income in full without incurring any additional tax
liability. This result seems intuitively correct because, had the short-term
capital loss instead been a short-term capital gain, it would have been
taxed at ordinary income rates and received no preferential tax treatment. Under such circumstances, allowing the short-term capital loss to
be deductible in full promotes
the policy goal of parallelism, as discussed
2°
in the sections that follow.
1.

Added Complexity Attributable to a Progressive Tax Rate Structure

The foregoing illustrations demonstrate that the basic structure of
the proposal is relatively straightforward to apply. Its complexity is, in
large part, a direct result of the progressivity of the tax rate structure. For
example, consider a taxpayer who has a relatively large long-term capital
loss and whose ordinary income otherwise falls near the bottom of a tax
bracket. Such a taxpayer could find that her loss offsets income that
tax bracket or above. For example, long-term capital gains arising out of the sale of collectibles are
taxed at a 28% rate, while unrecaptured § 1250 gain is taxed at a 25% rate (for taxpayers in the 15%
tax bracket, both types of gain are taxed at a 15% rate). See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying
text. Moreover, the general 20% long-term capital gains rate is reduced to 18% for assets acquired
after December 31, 2000, and held for more than five years (with a similar reduction to 8% for longterm capital gains otherwise taxed at 10%). See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. These
varying rates will also add significant complexity as this proposal is applied to the unlimited combinations of capital assets that taxpayers sell each year. Of course, this added complexity is attributable not
to the proposal set forth in this article but instead to the differing capital gains rates established in the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788. Whether these differing capital gains
rates can be justified from a policy standpoint is an interesting question, again best left to another article.
202. Considering how much intuitive sense this proposal makes, it is astonishing that no tax
scholar has seriously considered such a proposal before. For a passing reference to this notion nearly
40 years ago, see SMITH, supra note 109, at 150; see also U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, FEDERAL INCOME
TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES 103 (1951).

203. The resulting loss was a short-term capital loss because T had held his capital asset for one
year or less prior to its sale. See I.R.C. § 1222(2) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998).
204. See infra notes 228-41 and accompanying text.
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spans two tax brackets, resulting in a portion of the loss being taxed at
one tax rate and the remainder at a slightly higher rate."
Similarly, recall that a taxpayer in the 15% tax bracket will find that
her capital gains are taxed at a maximum rate of 10%."°6 If a taxpayer
otherwise in the 15 % bracket suffers a long-term capital loss, calculations
under this proposal become more complicated, again because of the progressivity of the tax rate structure. Had the long-term capital loss instead
been a gain, the gain would have been taxed at a 10% rate but only to
the extent that it "filled up" the taxpayer's 15% tax bracket. The remaining capital gain would have been taxed at a maximum rate of
20%.207 Yet because the taxpayer is only in the 15% tax bracket, offsetting a portion of her income at a 20% rate would require a subsidy from
the government, which this proposal does not suggest.2' Accordingly,
this loss limitation scheme is modified in this circumstance to provide
that the tax rate differential paid by the taxpayer on a long-term capital
loss is equal to the difference between the taxpayer's ordinary income
and the tax rate applicable to the loss had it instead been a gain in the
15% tax bracket. Thus, a taxpayer in the 15% bracket would offset his
ordinary income with the long-term capital loss up to a maximum tax
savings of 10% because, had the loss instead been a gain in the 15% tax
bracket, it would have been taxed at a maximum rate of 10%.209
205. For example, assume that T, a single taxpayer, sells her stock and realizes a $10,000 longterm capital loss. Ignoring any applicable deductions for ease of calculation, if T's taxable income
(without taking into consideration the loss) is $120,000 and the top of the 31% tax bracket is $115,000
for single taxpayers, $5,000 of the loss will offset income in the 36% tax bracket, while the remaining
$5,000 loss will offset income in the 31% tax bracket. If this loss had been a gain and thus taxed at a
20% rate, under this proposal T would be required to pay an 11% tax on $5,000 of income offset by
half of the capital loss (the 31% otherwise applicable tax rate minus the 20% tax rate applicable to
long-term capital gains), and T would also be required to pay a 16% tax on the $5,000 of ordinary income offset by the other half of the capital loss (36% minus 20%). A very large long-term capital loss
could span three or four tax brackets, requiring a taxpayer to make separate calculations with respect
to that portion of the loss offsetting income in each separate tax bracket.
206. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 1988 & West Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998); see also supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
207. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 1988 & West Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998).
208. As discussed supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text, although governmental subsidies and
refunds might be theoretically sound under traditional notions of an ideal income tax, they are administratively unfeasible.
209. For example, assume that taxpayer T is a single individual who earns $24,000 per year. Assume further that the top of the 15% tax bracket for single taxpayers is $25,000. If T suffers a $5,000
long-term capital loss on the sale of Widget Corporation stock, $1,000 of that loss (assuming no deductions for ease of computation) would have "filled up" T's 15% tax bracket had the loss instead been a
gain. Thus, $1,000 of the $5,000 long-term capital loss would offset 7s $24,000 salary at a maximum
tax savings of 10%. T would be required to pay tax at a 5% rate on that $1,000 of ordinary income offset by the loss (15% ordinary income tax bracket less the 10% maximum long-term capital gain rate).
Because the remaining $4,000 loss, had it instead been a gain, would have been taxed at a maximum
rate of 20%, it would be incongruous to allow T to offset income otherwise taxed in the 15% tax
bracket with a loss valued at a 20% tax rate. Accordingly, under this proposal, that additional $4,000
loss could offset $4,000 of T's ordinary income at the 10% rate otherwise applicable to long-term capital gains in the 15% tax bracket. Thus, T will pay a 5% rate differential on the entire $5,000 loss because, had it instead been a gain in the 15% tax bracket, it would have been taxed at a 10% preferential rate.
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Additional complexities arise when a taxpayer's long-term capital
loss offsets income both in the 15% tax bracket and the 28% tax bracket.
For example, assume that our single taxpayer, T, earns $28,000 in 1998,
and the maximum amount of income that could be earned in the 15% tax
bracket for a single taxpayer in 1998 is $25,000. If T suffers an $8,000
long-term capital loss in 1998, and the loss had instead been a gain, it
would have been taxed at a maximum rate of 20%, because T is in the
28% tax bracket. Yet only $3,000 of that loss is offsetting income in the
28% tax bracket; the remaining $5,000 loss is offsetting income in the
15% tax bracket. Accordingly, the proposal suggests that in such a situation, the loss limitation calculation be broken into two parts. First, the
$3,000 loss that offsets Ts income in the 28% tax bracket, had it instead
been a gain, would have been taxed at a maximum rate of 20%. Therefore, the ordinary income offset by that $3,000 loss should be taxed at a
rate of 8% (the 28% rate otherwise applicable to ordinary income less
the 20% maximum long-term capital gains rate). The remaining $5,000
loss, however, now offsets income in the 15% tax bracket, and a longterm capital gain for a taxpayer in the 15% tax bracket would be taxed at
a maximum rate of 10%. Thus, T's income that is offset by this $5,000
loss should be taxed at a maximum rate of 5% (the 15% tax bracket otherwise applicable to ordinary income less the 10% maximum long-term
capital gains rate).
2.

21 °
Application of the Netting Process to the Proposal

The proposal would also retain a portion of the netting process,
whereby long-term capital losses first offset long-term capital gains and
short-term capital losses first offset short-term capital gains before being
allowed to offset other income."' Retention of this portion of the netting
process would actually simplify the application of the proposal under certain circumstances. Consider, for example, a taxpayer in the 36% tax
bracket with a long-term capital gain of $8,000 and a long-term capital
loss of $5,000. Netting the $5,000 loss against the $8,000 gain would result
210. This proposal is unaffected by the netting process prescribed in § 1231 of the Code. See
I.R.C. § 1231 (1994). That section generally provides that gains and losses from the sale, exchange, or
compulsory or involuntary conversion of property used in a taxpayer's trade or business and held for
more than one year be netted together; if the gains exceed the losses after this netting process is completed, then all of the individual gains and losses will be treated as long-term capital gains and losses.
If, on the other hand, the losses exceed the gains as a result of this netting process, then each gain and
loss will be treated as an ordinary gain and an ordinary loss, respectively. See I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1)-(2)
(West 1988 & West Supp. 1998). This proposal would do nothing to change the § 1231 netting process;
however, if long-term capital gains and losses result from this netting process, my proposal would then
apply to limit the deductibility of the long-term capital losses. It should be noted, though, that because
long-term capital losses will first be netted against long-term capital gains, as set forth in this section,
and inasmuch as the gains by definition have already exceeded the losses under the § 1231 netting process, application of the proposal will merely result in the long-term capital losses being completely offset by the long-term capital gains.
211. For a complete discussion of the netting process, see supra note 128.
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in a net $3,000 long-term capital gain. Thus, none of the loss would be
offset against the taxpayer's ordinary income. Yet, the result to the taxpayer is the same as it would have been absent the netting process; in
both cases, the taxpayer used his long-term capital loss to offset income
otherwise taxed at a 20% rate.212
The portion of the netting process, however, that allows a taxpayer
to offset net long-term capital losses against net short-term capital gains
is antithetical to the policies underlying this proposal and, thus, would be
repealed under it.213 This is because the netting process allows long-term
capital losses, generally taxed at a 20% rate had they instead been gains,
to offset short-term capital gains otherwise taxed at ordinary income
rates. Under this article's proposed approach, if this portion of the netting process were to remain, it would result in a lack of horizontal equity
between taxpayers; two taxpayers with equal incomes and equal longterm capital losses would be treated differently, simply because one taxpayer fortuitously had a short-term capital gain against which to offset
the loss, while the other taxpayer did not.214 Similarly, the portion of the
netting process that requires taxpayers to offset net short-term capital
gains against 21net
long-term capital losses should also be repealed for the
5
same reason.

212.

This is true because, had the taxpayer had no long-term capital gains, he would have offset

the loss against $5,000 of ordinary income otherwise taxed at a 36% rate; however, he would have
been required to pay a 16% tax on that income (the 36% ordinary income rate less the 20% rate applicable to long-term capital gains).
213. It is interesting to note that this repeal of "cross-netting" was proposed once in 1938 but did
not find its way into the law. See SUBCOMM. OF COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 75TH CONG., REPORT ON
A PROPOSED REVISION OF THE REVENUE LAwS 48 (Comm. Print 1938), reprinted in 21 INTERNAL
REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 48. The Report states that

[tihe other and major change consists in the fact that the individual would be deprived of the
privilege of using short-term capital losses to offset long-term capital gains and vice versa. Your
subcommittee believes that the adoption of this recommendation will remove another substantial
defect in the existing law as it applies to capital gains and losses, a defect which has had a serious
detrimental effect upon the revenue.
Id., reprinted in 21 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF UNITED STATES 1909-1950, supra note 23, at 48.
214. For example, Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B are both in the 28% tax bracket, and both have a
long-term capital loss of $10,000. Taxpayer A also has a short-term capital gain of $10,000, while Taxpayer B does not. Thus, if this portion of the netting process were retained, Taxpayer A would be entitled to offset his $10,000 long-term capital loss against his $10,000 short-term capital gain, with a resulting tax savings of 28% (because short-term capital gains are taxed at ordinary income rates).
Taxpayer B, on the other hand, would offset his $10,000 long-term capital loss against his ordinary income but would be required to pay an 8% tax on the $10,000 of income offset by that loss (the 28%
tax rate otherwise applicable to ordinary income less the 20% tax rate applicable to long-term gains).
Accordingly, Taxpayer A is in a better position than Taxpayer B simply because of the fortuitous circumstance that he had an offsetting short-term capital gain. Of course, this disparate tax treatment
violates traditional notions of horizontal equity (that similarly situated taxpayers should be treated
similarly). For a more complete discussion of the concept of horizontal equity, see infra notes 235-37
and accompanying text.
215. This portion of the netting process violates horizontal equity because a taxpayer with a net
short-term capital loss who fortuitously has a net long-term capital gain is required to first offset the
short-term loss against the long-term gain, even though, had the loss instead been a gain, it would have
been taxed at ordinary income rates and is instead offsetting income that would have been taxed at a
preferential capital gains rate.
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Orderingof CapitalLosses

When taxpayers have both short-term and long-term capital losses
in a taxable year (after netting them against corresponding capital gains),
the order in which those losses are offset against ordinary income under
this proposal can have a dramatic impact on a taxpayer's ultimate tax liability under certain circumstances. Consider, for example, a somewhat
implausible scenario in which single taxpayer T has a $20,000 long-term
capital loss and a $20,000 short-term capital loss in 1998 and earns
$20,000 in that year. Ignoring any possible deductions, if T were permitted to offset his short-term capital loss against his wages before using his
long-term capital loss, then the short-term capital loss would offset the
wages in full, and T would have no tax liability for the year because the
short-term capital loss, had it instead been a short-term capital gain,
would have been taxed at ordinary income rates. Conversely, if T were
instead forced to offset his long-term capital loss against his ordinary income first, he would have to pay a 5% tax on that income, because the
loss, had it instead been a gain, would have been taxed at a 10% rate instead of the 15% rate otherwise applicable to his ordinary income.1 6 Under current law, T would be entitled in both situations to carry over the
unused $20,000 capital loss to future years, where it would retain its
character as either a short-term or long-term capital loss. 217 Nevertheless,
a tax savings in the current year is almost always preferable to a tax savings in a future year; thus, the order of deductibility of the short-term
and long-term capital losses is still of paramount importance to T.
A similar situation in which the ordering of capital losses can result
in very different tax liabilities to the taxpayer occurs when the short-term
and long-term capital losses, when taken in combination, place the taxpayer in a lower effective tax bracket. For example, in the previous example, assume that T earned $35,000 in 1998 and had a $10,000 longterm capital loss and a $10,000 short-term capital loss. Assume further
that the maximum income level in the 15% tax bracket for a single taxpayer in 1998 was $25,000. If T could use his short-term capital loss first
to offset his ordinary income, the loss would reduce his taxable income to
$25,000. Then, applying T's $10,000 long-term capital loss, T would be
required to pay only a 5% tax on the $10,000 of ordinary income offset
by that loss (15% ordinary income rate less the applicable 10% maximum long-term capital gains rate). Conversely, if T were first required to
use his long-term loss to offset ordinary income, the $10,000 of income
offset by that loss would be taxed at a rate of 8% (the 28% rate applica216. The same anomaly would result if T were in a higher tax bracket, albeit with different tax
rates applicable to the income offset by the long-term capital loss.
217. In the case of corporations, unused losses are first carried back to the previous three years
and applied against income in those years, and, to the extent that any losses remain, the losses can be
carried forward five years. See I.R.C. § 1212(a)(1) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998); see also supra note
128. The proposal outlined in this article retains these capital loss carryover and carryback rules.
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ble to ordinary income less the 20% maximum long-term capital gains
rate). This same phenomenon would occur if Ts income straddled, for
example, the 31% and 36% tax brackets. Thus, in each of these scenarios
it becomes necessary to determine how to order the deductibility of
short- and long-term capital losses.
The proposal resolves this difficult dilemma by providing that shortterm capital losses be used before long-term capital losses. This solution
is favorable to taxpayers (a position the government tends to disfavor)
yet can also be justified on sound policy grounds. When taxpayers realize
that they have made imprudent investment choices, liquidating those investments at the earliest possible moment and reinvesting the proceeds
in more prudent investments is an economically sound decision because
it puts the money toward its highest and best use. As a capitalist society
concerned with true economic growth, we encourage this type of economic efficiency in the marketplace.2" 8 Thus, by allowing taxpayers to
offset short-term capital losses against ordinary income first, the proposal
encourages this type of economically efficient investment behavior.
The final ordering issue concerns the sequence in which long-term
capital losses resulting from the sale of assets that would have produced
long-term capital gains taxed at varying rates, such as collectibles and assets held for more than five years and purchased after December 31,
2000,219 should be used to offset a taxpayer's ordinary income. The
Treasury Department has already provided guidance on this issue in another context. In Notice 97-59,22' the Treasury Department stated that in
the section 1231 context, if capital gains were required to be recaptured
as ordinary income under that section's lookback rule,221 those gains
subject to the highest tax rate would first be recharacterized as ordinary
income.222 The other remaining gains would be recharacterized in descending order of applicable tax rates.2 3
The proposal outlined in this article adopts the ordering rules established in Notice 97-59 but as applied to losses rather than gains. Thus,
losses resulting from an individual's sale of collectibles would first be
used to offset ordinary income because, had the losses instead been
gains, they would have been taxed at the highest long-term capital gains
rate of 28%.224 Next, losses resulting from the sale of general capital assets would be applied to reduce ordinary income because these losses
218. For a more complete discussion of why this proposal promotes economic efficiency, see infra
notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
219. For a discussion of the differing capital gains rates applicable to these assets, see supra notes
100-02 and accompanying text.
220. I.R.S. Notice 97-59, 1997-45 I.R.B. 7.
221. See I.R.C. § 1231(c) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998).
222. These would generally be gains from the sale of collectibles, which are taxed at a 28% rate.
See I.R.C. § 1(h)(5) (West 1988 & West Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998). These ordering rules are generally
quite favorable to taxpayers in the § 1231 context.
223. See I.R.S. Notice 97-59, 1997-45 I.R.B. 7-8.
224. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(5).
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would have been taxed at a preferential rate of 20% had they been
gains. 2' Finally, capital losses resulting from the sale of capital assets
purchased after December 31, 2000, and held for more than five years
would reduce the taxpayer's income because such losses would have
been taxed at an 18% rate had they been gains.226 Although these ordering rules are generally not favorable to taxpayers when applied to losses
(rather than gains, as in Notice 97-59), they are adopted by analogy in
this proposal for purposes of consistency, a goal that should be sought in
statutory drafting whenever possible.227
C.

Policy Justificationsfor the Loss Limitation Proposal

This new paradigm for limiting the deductibility of capital losses is
more theoretically sound than its predecessor in every sense. First, the
paradigm is premised on liability/savings parallelism rather than inclusion/deduction parallelism. 2' Accordingly, it is more fundamentally fair
than the current system because, unlike the current system, it does not
assume that taxpayers with capital losses have corresponding capital
gains with which to offset those losses. Similarly, the new paradigm is
more economically efficient; it allows taxpayers with true economic
losses to recoup those losses and use the resulting proceeds to invest in
more profitable ventures. Accordingly, the new paradigm permits taxpayers to put their money to its highest and best use, thereby spurring
economic growth. Finally, the paradigm is not only theoretically sound
but also, based on current public choice theory, has a reasonable likelihood of success in the political arena. The discussion that follows thus
justifies the new loss limitation paradigm on the grounds of fundamental
fairness, economic efficiency, and political feasibility.

225. See id. § l(h)(1)(C). Note that there is no reference to a loss resulting from the sale of § 1250
property because gains from the sale of § 1250 property are taxed at a rate of 25% only to the extent
that the gain represents unrecaptured § 1250 gain. There would be no such gain inherent in the sale of
§ 1250 property at a loss; thus, no 25% capital losses would ever offset income. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(7)
(West Supp. Oct. 1998).
226. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(2)(B) (West 1988 & West Supps. 1998 & Oct. 1998). For taxpayers in the
15% tax bracket, losses resulting from the sale of collectibles would also be used first to offset ordinary
income because, had the losses instead been gains, the losses would have been taxed at a 15% rate.
Next, losses resulting from the sale of general capital assets would be used to offset ordinary income
because general capital gains would have been taxed at a 10% rate. Finally, losses resulting from the
sale of capital assets that are sold after December 31, 2000, and held for more than five years would
offset ordinary income because such losses, had they instead been gains, would have been taxed at an
8% rate. See generally id. § 1(h)(2)(A).
227. Cf., e.g., ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 24 (1997) ("A statute should be read to avoid internal inconsistencies.").
228. For a complete discussion of these concepts, see supra notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
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FundamentalFairness

One of the cornerstones of the income tax system is that it is based
on fundamental fairness for all taxpayers.229 When Congress passed the
landmark Tax Reform Act of 1986, 2 the Act was premised on notions of
fundamental fairness:
The perception of fairness may be as important as fairness itself as a
goal of tax policy. The United States was once justly proud of the
taxpayer morale of its citizens. With media coverage of tax shelters
now commonplace and talk of "beating the system" prevalent in
conversation, taxpayers increasingly view the tax system as unfair
and wonder why they should pay taxes. One of the primary goals of
the Treasury Department study of fundamental tax reform is the
reversal of this threatening trend.... Adoption of fairer tax rules
would have a multiplier effect, as increased fairness would lead to
an improved
perception of fairness and, in turn, to better compli23
ance. 1
Yet despite the fact that the income tax system is purportedly based
on fundamental fairness notions, the current scheme for limiting the deductibility of capital losses is anything but fair for many taxpayers. Because the current loss limitation scheme is designed primarily to discourage the tax avoidance scheme of cherrypicking, its foundation is based on
inclusion/deduction parallelism. As discussed previously, under inclusion/deduction parallelism, the dollar amount of capital gains included in
the taxpayer's income equals the dollar amount of capital losses deducted from the taxpayer's income. 32 This type of parallelism assumes
that taxpayers with capital losses also have corresponding capital gains
and recognizes that they will be forced to sell the gain property to offset
their capital losses. Thus, although the present loss limitation system is
well designed to prevent cherrypicking by taxpayers with capital gains
and losses, it denies nearly any loss deduction for taxpayers with true
economic losses unfortunate enough not to have corresponding capital

gains with which to offset those losses."

229. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Barbara McDowell, Tax Reform 1985: The Quest for a Fairer,
More Efficient and Simpler Income Tax, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 5, 37-40 (1984).
230. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
231. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH, THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 16-17 (1984) [hereinafter 1984
TREASURY REPORT]; see also S. REP. No. 99-313, pt. 2, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. Vol. 3, at
3. ("[Olnly the most thorough reform could assure a simpler, fairer, and more efficient tax system
which could regain the trust of the American people.").
232. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
233. Of course, individual taxpayers can offset capital losses against a measly $3,000 of ordinary
income. See I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1994). On the other hand, for corporations that are allowed to deduct
capital losses only against capital gains, the current system could deny them any deductibility of their
legitimate economic losses. Moreover, even for taxpayers with capital gains and capital losses in their
portfolios, requiring those taxpayers to sell capital gains property to offset their capital losses could
require them to liquidate a profitable investment, thereby undermining economic efficiency in the
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The new loss limitation paradigm set forth in this article, on the
other hand, is premised on notions of liability/savings parallelism. Under
this type of parallelism, the tax savings resulting from deducting a capital
loss against ordinary income should equal the tax liability resulting from
the inclusion of a capital gain in income. This proposal does just that. It
first recognizes that parallelism, which attempts to counterbalance preferential capital gains rates by limiting the deductibility of capital losses, is
a sound policy justification for loss limitations generally. It then designs a
system for limiting those losses that is premised on the only fair type of
parallelism, liability/savings parallelism. Because the new paradigm allows taxpayers to offset their capital losses against any type of income, it
is more fundamentally fair to all taxpayers, even those who do not have
corresponding capital gains." Yet because the proposal caps the tax
savings at the rate otherwise accorded capital gains, it thus balances the
total tax benefit granted to taxpayers on their capital gains and losses.
It is a well-established principle of tax law that for a tax system to be
equitable, or fundamentally fair, it must at a minimum achieve horizontal
equity.235 Horizontal equity is satisfied if taxpayers in equal positions are
treated equally.236 Of course, defining when taxpayers are in equal positions is often difficult. For example, two single taxpayers earning identical amounts will have different tax burdens if one taxpayer owns a home
while the other rents a home. This is so because Congress has decided to
encourage home ownership by allowing deductions for interest paid on a
home mortgage and not allowing a deduction for rent paid on a principal
residence.37 Thus, taxpayers with identical income levels are not equally
situated if there is a valid policy justification for treating the two taxpaymarketplace. For a discussion of the economic efficiency arguments supporting the new loss limitation
paradigm, see infra notes 242-51 and accompanying text.
234. Although the proposal outlined in this article promotes fundamental fairness for all taxpayers, it does not render all taxpayers better off than they are under the current system. For example, a
taxpayer who has only a $3,000 long-term capital loss can fully deduct that loss against $3,000 of ordinary income under I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1994). Under the new proposal, the taxpayer could still offset the
loss against ordinary income, but there would be a tax cost for doing so equal to the difference between the taxpayer's marginal tax rate applicable to ordinary income and the 20% rate applicable to
capital gains. Thus, even though the proposed loss limitation scheme is more fundamentally fair for all
taxpayers, that does not mean that all taxpayers benefit under the proposal.
235. See, e.g., 1984 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 231, at 14 ("A tax that places significantly different burdens on taxpayers in similar economic circumstances is not fair."); Richard A. Musgrave,
ET, OT and SBT, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 3, 4-5 (1976), reprinted in RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC
FINANCE INA DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 260, 260-61 (1986); see also Stuart Rosow, The Treasury's Reform Proposals:Not a Fair Tax, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 58, 61 (1984). Of course, an equitable tax
system must also achieve vertical equity, in which taxpayers having differing income levels "pay differing proportions of their income in tax." Id.; see also MUSGRAVE, supra, at 261. The current system's
progressive tax rate structure is said to achieve vertical equity, although not all scholars have accepted
this conclusion. See, e.g., Rosow, supra,at 62.
236. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 235, at 261; see also S. REP. No. 99-313, pt. 2, at 4, reprinted in
1986-3 C.B. Vol. 3, at 4.
237. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998). One could certainly argue that there
is no valid policy justification for encouraging home ownership over home rental, but that contention
is beyond the scope of this article.
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ers differently by, for example, allowing expenses of only one taxpayer to
be deducted against his income.
Under the current loss limitation system, two equally situated taxpayers with identical income levels and capital losses could experience
quite different tax burdens simply because one taxpayer had capital gains
against which to offset his capital losses and the other taxpayer did not.
Because there is no policy justification for penalizing a taxpayer for lack
of capital gains, the current system clearly violates notions of horizontal
equity.
Conversely, the proposal set forth in this article satisfies horizontal
equity by eliminating this unwarranted distinction between taxpayers. It
is a more equitable system than the system currently in place, thereby
promoting fundamental fairness and encouraging taxpayer compliance
with the tax laws.
The new loss limitation paradigm also promotes notions of fundamental fairness in other ways. For example, under the current system,
even though short-term capital gains are taxed at ordinary income rates,
short-term capital losses are nevertheless limited in deductibility and often must be used under the netting process to offset long-term capital
gains, otherwise taxed at preferential rates.238 Under the new proposal,
however, short-term capital losses need only be netted against short-term
capital gains. Any unused loss resulting from this netting process can offset ordinary income in full. This scheme promotes notions of fundamental fairness because, unlike the current system, it recognizes the differences inherent in the taxation of short-term and long-term capital gains.
It simply makes intuitive sense that if capital gains are taxed at ordinary
income rates, corresponding losses should be entitled to offset ordinary
income in full. Moreover, recognizing that fundamental fairness concerns
apply to the government as well, the converse is true with respect to
long-term capital losses. Under the current system, long-term capital
losses can offset short-term capital gains otherwise taxed at ordinary income rates. Because the new proposal permits long-term capital losses to
offset only long-term capital gains before offsetting ordinary income at a
reduced rate, it protects the government against lost revenue resulting
from long-term capital losses offsetting short-term capital gains in full.
Finally, the new loss limitation paradigm alleviates the bunching
problem caused when losses accruing over a number of years are consolidated into the single year of sale. Because a large capital loss realized
in a single tax year could, under certain circumstances, enable taxpayers
to move into lower tax brackets, the proposal accounts for such a windfall by capping the tax savings generated by the loss at the tax rate otherwise accorded capital gains.239 Moreover, to the extent that the loss is a
238. See I.R.C. § 1222 (1994); see also supranote 126 and accompanying text.
239. For a more complete discussion of the bunching concept, see supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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short-term capital loss, the proposal recognizes that bunching is not a
problem to be remedied2' by allowing the loss to offset ordinary income
in full with no tax liability differential. Although the current loss limitation system also attempts to alleviate the bunching problem, it again does
so only for taxpayers who have capital gains with which to offset their
losses.241
2.

Economic Efficiency

I begin this section with a seemingly obvious assumption but one
that does not appear to have been taken into consideration in creating
the current loss limitation system: economic growth is positive and
should be encouraged.242 Economists have long recognized that to encourage economic growth, taxpayers must invest in risky undertakings:243
"[R]isk investment is especially important for economic growth.... Special taxation [of capital gains and losses] is advocated to increase the total
amount of capital, to encourage its [use] in more risky investments, and
to prevent successful investments from being frozen into their existing
form." 2" Because every investment, and particular a risky investment, involves the possibility that taxpayers will suffer losses, investments will
not be made unless taxpayers determine that the possible return on their
investments is sufficiently high to offset the risk of possible losses.245 As
discussed previously, two noted economists, Domar and Musgrave, have
demonstrated that allowing capital losses to be offset in full would encourage taxpayers to invest in riskier ventures than if losses could not be
deducted.2"
To encourage taxpayers to undertake risky investments, thereby
stimulating economic growth, a loss limitation system must be economically efficient. When I use economic efficiency in this context, I am referring to the basic economic principle that resources are being used efficiently when they are employed in their highest and most valuable use.247
240. This is so because the taxpayer would have held the property for one year or less under
I.R.C. § 1222(2) (West 1988 & West Supp. 1998), thereby causing no bunching of losses that accrued
over many years into the year of sale.
241. It is recognized that, if bunching were the primary policy justification for limiting the deductibility of capital losses, both the proposal outlined in this article and the current tax system would
be imprecise means by which to alleviate the bunching problem. See, e.g., Snoe, supra note 105, at 71;
see also Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 34, at 328. A more precise remedy for the bunching problem would be to require that capital losses accruing over several years be deducted ratably over those
years. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 36, at 1132-33 (proposing such a solution with respect to the
bunching problem inherent in taxing capital gains).
242. See 1984 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 231, at 102-05; see also Richard A. Musgrave,
Growth with Equity, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323-27 (1963), reprinted in MUSGRAVE, supra note 235,
at 198, 198-201.
243. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 137, at 108; see also SMITH, supra note 109, at 125.
244. SMrrH, supranote 109, at 125.
245.

See MUSGRAVE, supra note 137, at 108.

246.
247.

See id. at 109-10; see also supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
See POSNER, supra note 107, at 9. The concept of economic efficiency is, of course, far more
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The current loss limitation system is not economically efficient because
taxpayers are encouraged to retain economically unproductive assets
(loss assets) until they have assets with gains to sell so that the gains can
be used to offset those losses.2" Thus, the current system is economically
inefficient because it discouragestaxpayers from investing their resources
in such a manner as to produce the highest value. Conversely, because
the new loss limitation system proposed in this article does not depend
on the existence of capital gains as a prerequisite to the deductibility of
capital losses, it encourages losses to be taken as soon as taxpayers determine that their investments are economically unfeasible.249 Because
taxpayers can use their capital losses to offset income currently, they can
more readily reinvest the proceeds in more profitable ventures, thereby
putting their assets to their highest and best use.
Economic efficiency has also been promoted in the tax law through
the use of economic neutrality. The Treasury Department recently stated
that its foremost tax reform goal is to promote economic neutrality." By
using the concept of economic neutrality, "the Treasury manifests its
judgment that the tax system should not interfere with a free market
economy, which tends 'to allocate economic resources to their most productive uses."'"' The new loss limitation paradigm set forth in this article
promotes economic neutrality because it permits investors to decide
complex than is stated in the text of this article. Economists have separately classified at least three
different types of economic efficiency. "Under the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, a change
from one state of affairs to another is efficient if the winners could compensate the losers." Patrick B.
Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV.
501, 519 (1997); see also Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 636 (1994) ("The Kaldor-Hicks standard
holds that a given allocation of resources is efficient if the gains to the winners are large enough such
that the winners could compensate the losers and still be better off."). Most commentators recognize
that the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency is the most commonly used notion of efficiency in law
and economics literature. See POSNER, supra note 107, at 13; McCaffery, supra, at 636.
The second notion of economic efficiency is Pareto superiority. "A Pareto-superior transaction is
one that makes at least one person in the world better off and no one worse off." POSNER, supra note
107, at 12. Thus, Pareto superiority is similar to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, except that those who have
benefited from a change in the law actually compensate those who lose as a result of such a change.
See McCaffery, supra, at 638.
The final type of efficiency often used by economists is Pareto optimality. "A state of affairs is Pareto optimal when no change from such a state is possible that results in one person being better off
without making another person worse off." Crawford, supra, at 516; see also McCaffery, supra, at 638.
When the term "efficiency" is used in this article, the concept of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is being
employed. Those taxpayers who stand to benefit from the more favorable deductibility of their capital
losses are not being forced to compensate the "losers," those who might be required to pay more in
taxes to offset the revenue loss resulting from the proposal. Thus, although Pareto superiority could be
met with this proposal because "the winners could compensate the losers," POSNER, supra note 107, at
13, the proposal does not call for such direct compensation.
248. In the absence of a current tax benefit from the sale of loss assets, taxpayers will likely retain
the loss assets in the hope that they will turn around and become profitable.
249. Accordingly, the loss limitation paradigm set forth in this article comports with the admonition of Domar and Musgrave that the current tax system should be modified so as to allow for more
favorable loss offsets for every type of investor. See MUSGRAVE, supra note 137, at 111.
250. See 1984 TREASURY REPORT, supranote 231, at 13.
251. Rosow, supra note 235, at 64 (quoting 1984 TREASURY REPORT, supranote 231, at 13).
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whether it is economically efficient for them to sell their loss assets and
reinvest the proceeds in other ventures, wholly apart from tax considerations.
3.

PoliticalFeasibility

Current legal literature contains a vast and ever-increasing number
of proposals to reform the income tax system. 2 The sheer number of articles concerning tax reform is a tribute to the growing notion that reform
is still necessary. Many proposals calling for a change in the current tax
system, however, have little chance of ever being adopted by Congress. 2 3
Such proposals may indeed illustrate inequity or inefficiency in the tax
system but do not have even a remote chance of becoming law because
they fail to demonstrate adequately how to solve the problems they address. Such proposals tend to be academic exercises in theory and logic
rather than workable solutions that Congress might adopt.
The political journey that a good proposal takes before it becomes
law is long and difficult, in large part because the proposal must satisfy
the desires of interest groups. 24 Public choice theory, which studies the
application of economic theory to political processes, has examined the
use of political power wielded by interest groups as a means for understanding the legislative process. 5 In this section, I use public choice theory to demonstrate that the loss limitation paradigm set forth in this article is more than just an academic daydream; rather, it is politically
feasible and can be used to improve the income tax system.
Recognizing that interest groups play a dominant role in shaping
legislation,"' two noted political scientists pioneered a new theoretical
252. See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913,913 (1987).

253. Tax scholars have long recognized that the proposed changes to the income tax system most
seriously considered are the ones advocating incremental changes to the system rather than those arguing for fundamental and wholesale changes to the law. See, e.g., Shakow, supra note 7, at 1111.
254.

See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE

THEORY OF GROUPS (1971); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 906 (1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence of Public

Choice] ("Interest groups play a significant role in the legislative process and thus in shaping our society."); see also, e.g., Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding)
Public Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1988); Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEX. L.

REV. 1013 (1988); Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 252, at 962 ("[Slpecial interests will provide
the feed [for new tax legislation] as long as tax-writers and other legislators belly up to the trough.").
255. In his book on public choice theory, Dennis Mueller defined public choice theory as "the
economic study of nonmarket decisionmaking, or simply the application of economics to political science." DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979); see also Paul, supra note 36, at 176 ("[P]ublic
choice theory urges that ... lawmakers' desires to promote their self-interests place disproportionate
influence in the hands of small, well-organized interest groups." ).
256. Over 50 years ago, political scientists argued that the influence of interest groups on the legislative process was indeed a profound one. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?
DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY 5 (1961) (arguing that interest groups govern the
political system); EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN BASING-POINT
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model for determining the likelihood that a proposed piece of legislation
would ultimately be passed by Congress, based primarily on the influence of interest groups in the legislative process." 7 These political scientists, James Q. Wilson and Michael Hayes, hypothesized that the level of
interest group activity on either side of a proposed piece of legislation
would vary depending upon whether the costs associated with the proposed legislation and the benefits to be derived from the legislation were
concentrated in a small group or widely distributed throughout society."
The model, which I refer to as the Wilson-Hayes Transactional
Model, is divided into four quadrants. 59 In the first quadrant, both the
costs associated with a proposed piece of legislation and the benefits to
be derived from it are widely distributed throughout society."6 The
authors argue that in this quadrant, interest groups are not likely to be
well formed on either side of the legislation because of the free rider
problem;26' that is, why should interest groups expend valuable resources
to oppose a particular piece of legislation when society as a whole will effortlessly benefit from their opposition? The model also suggests that,
because legislators are motivated primarily by their desire to be reelected, 62 proposed legislation falling within the first quadrant has a low
likelihood of success because legislators would gain few, if any, votes
from interest groups by passing such legislation.263
LEGISLATION 1-53 (1965) (discussing the role of interest groups in the political process); E. E.
SCHATrSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF 103-278 (1935) (discussing the political
behavior and internal politics of interest groups); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL
PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 10-11 (1958) (stating that interest groups are a

"characteristic aspect of our society"). More recently, legal scholars have adopted a similar view. See
generally, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 18 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982); Richard A. Epstein, Toward
a Revitalization of the ContractClause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 704 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). Not all political scientists, however, agree with the notion that interest
groups dominate the political process. For a complete discussion of scholarly challenges to the interest
group dominance theory, see Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence of Public Choice, supra note 254, at
884-85.
257. See generally MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS & LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
MARKETS (1981); JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973).
258. See HAYES, supra note 257, at 65; WILSON, supra note 257, at 331-32.

259. See HAYES, supra note 257, at 65; WILSON, supra note 257, at 332-37. The Wilson-Hayes
Transactional Model is also referred to as the Wilson/Hayes Matrix.
260. For a more complete discussion of when the costs and benefits associated with proposed legislation are widely distributed or narrowly concentrated, see HAYES, supra note 257, at 65-66; see also
WILSON, supra note 257, at 331-32.
261. See HAYES, supra note 257, at 90.
262. See id. at 93; Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 252, at 946; see also Paul, supra note 36, at
176. It is important to note that some scholars criticize the assumption that legislators are principally
motivated by the desire for reelection. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 36, at 178 ("[The] assumption that a
legislator's self-interest consists exclusively of attaining reelection overlooks that legislators often have
other goals, such as enhancing their personal prestige, wealth, and career prospects, and improving the
public welfare.").
263. See HAYES, supra note 257, at 120-26. But Wilson points out that if the benefits to the public
are material, such as an increase in social security benefits, legislators have some incentive to increase
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Proposed legislation that would have concentrated benefits to a
small group of society, with the costs of such legislation being distributed
widely throughout society, falls into the model's second quadrant.2" The
authors posit that proposed legislation falling within this quadrant will
have strong interest group activity in favor of the legislation (by that concentrated group seeking to benefit from the legislation) with little or no
interest group activity in opposition because the general public has little,
if any, incentive to organize a strong opposition.265 Thus, legislation falling within the second quadrant has a strong likelihood of success in
Congress because legislators would be rewarded (through political campaign contributions2 6 and votes at reelection267) for passing such legislation and yet would not alienate any interest groups opposing the legislation. According to Hayes, transactions in which there are concentrated
benefits and distributed costs "are consensual because losers are outside
the legal process, perhaps even unaware that they are threatened by the
legislation.""6
The model's third quadrant contains proposed legislation in which
the benefits are widely distributed throughout society, but the costs are
borne by a small group, such as environmental legislation.269 As one
would expect, the model suggests that little interest group activity would
form in support of the legislation, but there would be strong interest
group activity opposing the legislation.27 ° Accordingly, proposed legislation falling within this quadrant would have little likelihood of success in
the legislative process because legislators would gain few votes or economic support from passing the legislation and would risk losing considerable support from the interest groups opposing the legislation.271
those widely distributed benefits with little cost because there is insignificant organizational intervention. See WILSON, supra note 257, at 332.
264. See HAYES, supra note 257, at 66; WILSON, supra note 257, at 333.
265. See HAYES, supra note 257, at 66 ("Concentrated benefits combined with widely distributed
costs will tend to produce distributive subgovernments characterized by strong clientele support and
no permanent organized opposition."); WILSON, supra note 257, at 333 ("Programs that benefit a welldefined special interest but impose, or appear to impose, no visible costs on any other well-defined
interest will attract the support of the organizations representing the benefited group and the opposisee also Paul, supra note 36, at 176 ("[C]ollective action problems subvert the abil");
tion of none ....
ity of members of the diffuse general public to communicate their views to legislators.").
266. See Doernberg & McChesney, supra note 252, at 914.
267. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
268. HAYES, supra note 257, at 99.
269. See id. at 102.
270. See WILSON, supra note 257, at 334 ("When a specific, easily identifiable group bears the
costs of a program conferring distributed benefits, the group is likely to feel its burdens keenly and
thus to have a strong incentive to organize in order that their burdens be reduced or at the very least
not increased.").
271. See HAYES, supra note 257, at 102-08. Hayes notes, however, that if a political issue such as
pollution captures the public interest, public interest groups will form in favor of the proposed legislation. But because the public is relatively uninformed, symbolic gestures, such as the creation of regulatory agencies designed to act in the public interest, often satisfy proponents' demands. At the same
time, legislators have satisfied the strong interest groups opposing the legislation by not enacting tough
regulatory legislation. See id. at 103-04, 107; see also WILSON, supra note 257, at 335.
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Finally, the model's fourth quadrant contains proposed legislation
where both the costs and benefits associated with the legislation are concentrated in small groups.2" The model posits that strong interest groups
would form both in favor of and in opposition to such proposed legislation.27 3 Accordingly, legislators would be unlikely to pass such legislation
for fear of alienating the group in opposition; yet, in an effort to appease
the group favoring such proposed legislation, legislators would likely
provide that group with some form of symbolic victory by, for example,
proposing that the issue be resolved through agency regulation.274
Under the Wilson-Hayes Transactional Model, the loss limitation
proposal contained in this article would likely be classified as having concentrated benefits and distributed costs. The obvious benefit from this
proposal is that capital losses can often be deducted at an earlier point in
time than under the current system, allowing taxpayers to reinvest the
tax savings, thereby increasing their net worth. 275 The tax benefits derived
from the new loss limitation paradigm are likely to be concentrated in
corporations and middle- and upper-income taxpayers who can afford to
invest in the stock market and other risky ventures, such as limited partnerships. Accordingly, the Wilson-Hayes Transactional Model would
classify these benefits as concentrated.276
The costs of the proposal, on the other hand, would be widely distributed. The tax savings that those benefiting from the proposal would
enjoy would reduce aggregate tax revenue. To compensate for this lost
tax revenue, Congress would be required either to broaden the income
tax base by taxing sources of income that are currently untaxed (or reducing or eliminating deductions) or to increase tax rates generally. Accordingly, the costs associated with this proposal would be widely distributed throughout society.
Because this new loss limitation proposal would enjoy concentrated
benefits and distributed costs, the proposal would have a very high probability of success in the legislative process under the Wilson-Hayes
272.

See HAYES, supra note 257, at 108.

273. See WILSON, supranote 257, at 335.
274. See HAYES, supra note 257, at 93, 108-20. "[C]ongressmen will ... avoid choice through legislative delegation when confronting a conflictual constituency." Id. at 93. Some economists argue that
the outcome of proposed legislation when strong interest groups have formed on both sides is not
quite as simple as Wilson and Hayes might argue. For example, one interest group's ability to eliminate the free rider problem or to reduce its overhead could have a significant impact on its strength
relative to the opposing interest group and could ultimately influence the outcome of the legislative
process. For a more complete discussion of these concepts, see Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among PressureGroups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983). Hayes does recognize
this point when he states in passing that "[g]roups do ... vary in organizational style and maintenance
needs, so the rational response of reelection-minded congressmen will be a function of the configuration of demand and will result in a complex supply pattern." HAYES, supra note 257, at 127.
275. This ability to reinvest is the classic example of the time value of money. See, e.g., David M.
Schizer, Realizationas Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1551-52, 1557-58 (1998).
276. Although typical wage owners may occasionally experience a modest benefit from the implementation of this proposal, the greater benefits reside with those taxpayers who are deriving a
larger portion of their income from investment activities than typical wage earners would derive.
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Transactional Model. According to Hayes, "Congress will allocate freely
under such circumstances. In the absence of attentive opposition groups,
there are no significant electoral costs associated with explicit alloca' Thus, although no model can accurately predict the outcome of
tion."277
legislation in every circumstance because of the complexities inherent in
the legislative process,27 these widely accepted principles of public choice
theory indicate that the proposal set forth in this article does, indeed,
have a realistic chance of becoming law.
D. PotentialCriticisms of the Proposal
Like any other proposed change in the law, this new loss limitation
scheme could be subjected to criticism. The two major criticisms that
might be waged against this proposal are that it benefits only wealthy
taxpayers and that it adds significant complexity to the Code. This section of the article addresses these potential criticisms with the intent of
alleviating the concerns upon which they are based.
First, because the ability to invest is seen as the purview of only
wealthy taxpayers, any proposal aimed at reducing the capital gains rate
or improving the deductibility of capital losses will be subject to the criticism that it benefits only the wealthy. It is no doubt true that taxpayers at
the lowest income levels cannot afford to invest in risky ventures, such as
the stock market or limited partnerships, which produce deductible capital losses. It is likely that any capital losses suffered by these taxpayers
will be with respect to personal use assets, such as their cars or homes.
These losses are, of course, nondeductible.279 There has, however, been
significant media attention in recent years to the phenomenon that middle-income taxpayers are investing in the stock market in ever-increasing
numbers.2' Accordingly, the image that the stock market is accessible
only to the wealthy is no longer accurate.
If one accepts the notion that it is no longer just wealthy taxpayers
who might suffer deductible capital losses, then it is fair to ask whether
middle- or upper-income taxpayers would benefit more from the proposal in this article. For the reasons set forth below, I believe that middle-income taxpayers are far more likely to benefit from this proposal
than are the wealthiest taxpayers, thereby negating the argument that the
proposal favors only the wealthy.

277. HAYES, supra note 257, at 99.
278. See, e.g., id. at 159.
279. See I.R.C. § 165 (1994); see also id. § 262.
280. See Market Correction Predicted but Greenspan Says It's Hard to Guess When, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, July 23, 1998, at 1D ("[M]iddle-income Americans... now own trillions of dollars of
stock through individual retirement accounts, 401(K) plans and mutual funds .... "); see also Patrice
Hill, IMF Faults Asians for Financial Problems, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at B7 ("$20 trillion in
assets [are] held by ordinary, middle-income investors in mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, banks and investment houses ...").
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First, because middle-income taxpayers are less likely to afford to
hire financial planners and other investment advisors, these investors will
often have less perfect investment information than their wealthier counterparts. Accordingly, middle-income taxpayers will be more likely to
suffer investment losses due to poor investment decisions. Moreover,
with smaller investment portfolios, middle-income investors are less
likely than wealthier taxpayers to have capital gains against which to offset those losses, a critical feature under the current loss limitation system.
Both the likelihood of more capital losses and fewer capital gains against
which to offset them indicate that middle-income investors would enjoy a
greater benefit from the new capital loss limitation scheme than would
upper-income taxpayers. Moreover, as one tax scholar noted, even if "the
objection is that folks like J. P. Morgan would get away without paying
taxes, the question of the appropriate treatment
of losses is begged by an
281
ad hominem polemic against the wealthy.
Finally, should a monetary emergency arise, such as a sudden illness, wealthier taxpayers would likely have a sufficient cash reserve
available to meet such an emergency. Middle-income taxpayers, on the
other hand, could be forced to liquidate their investments to generate
sufficient cash to meet the monetary crisis. And if the crisis occurred
during a down market, such investors would suffer capital losses in situations where wealthier taxpayers would not. Thus, each of these scenarios
suggests that this new loss limitation paradigm is at least as likely to
benefit middle-income taxpayers as it is those in the upper-income tax
brackets.
The second criticism that might be waged against this proposal is
that it adds complexity to an already overburdened Code. At the outset I
will concede that the new loss limitation scheme would, in fact, add a certain amount of complexity to the Code. Accordingly, the remainder of
this discussion will focus on why complexity is at worst inevitable and at
best, even desirable.
A cursory glance at earlier versions of the Code should convince a
reader that the tax code has steadily become more complex. The desire
to simplify the Code is not a new idea. Thomas Adams once stated that
he would "vote for simplicity and inequality, selecting many simple taxes
at light rates rather than more equitable but more complex taxes at
' However old the desire
heavier rates."282
for tax simplification might be,
attempts at broad scale simplification of the Code have failed miserably.
For example, one of the three principal goals of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 was to create a simpler tax system. 283 Yet, the Tax Reform Act of
281.

Warren, supra note 135, at 310 (footnote omitted).

282.

Thomas S. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q.J. ECON. 527,

553 (1921).
283. See S.REP. No. 99-313, pt. 2, at 3-4 (1986), reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. Vol. 3, at 3-4; see also
1984 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 231, at 15 ("An important goal of the Treasury Department
study of fundamental tax reform is simplification. During June of 1984, the Treasury Department held
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1986 did not achieve the simplification that its drafters had so desired.
Several explanations for this failure have been offered. One of the most
persuasive arguments, and one that echoes Adams' dilemma, is that attempting to satisfy the dual goals of the equitable distribution of tax burdens and the need for achieving certainty in determining one's tax liability necessarily leads to complexity.' "Complexity is a bi-product of a tax
regime's reconciliation of the lofty aspiration to distribute tax burdens
equitably and the mundane requirement that the tax be susceptible to
administration and compliance." 5 It is simply impossible to achieve simplification in a complex society.'
Moreover, empirical data suggest that "complication of a tax regime
is correlated with the amount of tax revenue that the regime raises."'
Thus, the federal income tax system, which raises and often redistributes
significant revenue each year, is likely to be more complex simply because the stakes are so high.' In addition, the specific needs demanded
by special interest groups and lawmakers' drafting competence (or incompetence) also add to the Code's complexity."s9
In the final analysis, complexity is inevitable in a politically based
tax system that often succumbs to interest group pressure. 2" More importantly, complexity may even be desirable because it promotes the dual
goals of equity and certainty." 1 Until the goals of raising revenue and
implementing public policy are divorced from the Code, an unlikely occurrence, the Code will retain its complexity in all its grandeur.
V.

CONCLUSION

In a society aimed at promoting economic growth, capital losses
must be deductible in some form to encourage taxpayers to undertake

hearings on fundamental tax reform in seven U.S. cities. One of the themes repeated most frequently
by citizens appearing at those hearings was the need for simplification of the income tax.").
284. See Paul, supra note 36, at 163-73; see also SIMONS, supra note 72, at 157 ("It is the main purpose of the income tax to secure an equitable, progressive distribution of tax burdens among individuals....).
285. SIMONS, supra note 72, at 155.
286. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 7, at 2-3; see also Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax
Simplification, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1267, 1278.
287. Paul, supra note 36, at 173.
288. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 7, at 2 ("When such a tax [the income tax] is imposed on tens of
millions of taxpayers at rates yielding tens of billions of dollars, only an incorrigible optimist could exIncome taxation entails a high level
pect the kind of simplicity that can be achieved with a poll tax ....
of irreducible complexity.").
289. See id. at 176-77 ("[Slince tax simplicity is not an ideal that is likely to develop its own independent constituency, complicated, intractable, and incoherent legislation is likely to ensue, according
to the public choice view, as self-promoting politicians pander to the special interests by sprinkling
loopholes throughout the federal income tax without any regard for the costs imposed on the rest of
society.").
290. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 286, at 1304-07; Paul, supranote 36, at 164.
291. See Paul, supra note 36, at 163. But see McCaffery, supra note 286, at 1268, 1284-87 (arguing
that complexity often fails to promote equity).
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risky investments. Yet, in part because capital gains are taxed at preferential rates for valid policy reasons, it has long been agreed that Congress must limit the deductibility of capital losses to counterbalance this
tax preference.
The current loss limitation system is designed not to provide parallel
treatment of capital gains and losses but rather to encourage taxpayers to
realize their capital gains earlier than they might otherwise desire. As a
result, it promotes economically inefficient investment decision-making
and treats similarly situated taxpayers differently, thereby violating traditional notions of fundamental fairness and horizontal equity.
The new loss limitation paradigm proposed in this article provides
for parallel treatment of capital gains and losses by limiting the tax savings generated by capital losses to the tax rate applicable to capital gains.
Because taxpayers need no longer wait to sell their loss property until
they generate offsetting gains, the proposal promotes economic efficiency by encouraging taxpayers to put their resources to their highest
and best use. Moreover, the proposal is fairer than the current system
because taxpayers are no longer treated differently for tax purposes simply because one taxpayer has fortuitously generated capital gains against
which to offset her losses.
This paradigm would add a modest amount of additional complexity
to the Code. Complexity is not only inevitable in a complex society but
desirable because it promotes the equitable distribution of tax costs and
benefits and provides certainty for taxpayers when handling their financial affairs. Surely the benefits of efficiency and equity resulting from this
proposal outweigh any costs of additional complexity.
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